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Abstract 
Öhman and Mineka (2001) proposed the existence of an evolved fear module with four 
Fodorian characteristics of modularity.  They presented evidence that the fear module is 
selective, automatic, encapsulated, and operates in dedicated subcortical neural circuitry.  The 
consistently rapid physiological and behavioral (attention capture) evidence (e.g., Öhman & 
Mineka, 2001) provides clear support for its automaticity.  However, recent developments (e.g., 
Blanchette, 2006) cast doubt on the selectivity of the module.  Specifically, it is unclear whether 
or not the fear module automatically responds selectively to evolutionarily ancient fear stimuli or 
whether modern threats may also elicit automatic responding.  Furthermore, previous research 
using visual search paradigms has produced unclear results regarding the evolutionarily derived 
selectivity of the fear module.  Unfortunately, the visual search method is notoriously sensitive to 
visual characteristics of stimuli (Duncan & Humphreys, 1989).  However, eye movements 
provide a valid alternative measure of covert attention capture.  In order to clarify the issues, 
Experiment 1 used an oculomotor inhibition paradigm to present ancient and modern threats with 
one another or neutral stimuli in competition for visual attention.  In addition, we collected 
measures of participants’ experience with the stimuli to assess the influence of 
experience/familiarity/learning on rapid attention to threats.  Furthermore, because image 
inversion maintains low level stimulus characteristics (e.g., spatial frequencies, contrast, and 
luminance) while disrupting the semantic processing of images, presenting the stimulus pairs 
upside down was used to determine whether any observed effects were due to low level stimulus 
characteristics.  Experiment 1 produced null results with respect to systematic differences in 
attentional processes as a function of threat type.  Because Experiment 1 was modeled after 
  
Nummenmaa et al., (2009, Exp 3), it was therefore necessary to attempt to replicate their 
findings.  Experiment 2 successfully replicated the findings of Nummenmaa et al.  Therefore, it 
is suggested that the rapid attention processes responsible for systematic deviations in saccade 
trajectories seen in Experiment 2 (and Nummenmaa et al., 2009, Exp 3) do not translate to the 
methodology used in Experiment 1.  Given the findings from the present study, the question of 
whether or not there exists and evolved fear module remains open.  This study clearly supports 
the existence of an attentional bias for emotional content as indicated through the use of 
oculomotor inhibition paradigm.  However, like the visual search methodology, the oculomotor 
inhibition paradigm appears to be very sensitive to visual differences of the stimuli.  
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Chapter 1 - Introduction and Literature Review 
In order to evolve and pass on their genetic legacy our ancestors had to persevere in harsh 
environments rife with threats where their survival depended on eating and not being eaten.  Our 
ancestors had the ability to respond quickly to threats, thereby surviving to pass on their genes.  
This ability requires rapidly attuned visual attention. The purpose of the present research is to 
gain a deeper understanding of how visual attention is allocated to threats in the modern 
environment.  We ask to what extent our visual attention to threatening and fear-relevant objects 
is influenced by our evolutionary history.  The answer to this question has implications for 
theories of fear responding and visual attention.  It also carries practical implications for safety 
and survival in modern times. 
The study of fear has a rich history (Cannon, 1929; LeDoux, 1996; LeDoux, 2000; 
Öhman, Eriksson, & Olofsson, 1975; Öhman, Fredrikson, Hugdahl, & Rimmö, 1978; Öhman & 
Mineka, 2001) and great strides have been made toward understanding the physiological and 
cognitive nature of the fear response.  The predominant theory of how threatening stimuli evoke 
physiological fear responses and receive enhanced attention is Öhman and Mineka’s (2001) “fear 
module.”  Öhman and Mineka’s theoretical fear module is proposed to have evolved to detect 
certain stimuli and evoke physiological and behavioral changes in response.  Their theory of an 
evolved fear module (Öhman & Mineka, 2001) is based on multiple lines of converging evidence 
and organized around Fodorian principles of modularity (Fodor, 1983).  According to Öhman 
and Mineka, the fear module has developed through evolutionary selection and has four essential 
characteristics of modularity.  Specifically, the fear module is automatic in the sense that its 
response is evoked rapidly and directly by the ancient threat stimuli even in the absence of 
2 
 
conscious perception.  The fear module is encapsulated in that it is resistant to influences of 
higher cognition.  The fear module is composed of dedicated neural circuitry centered on the 
amygdala which has a known role in emotional responding, especially fear responding (LeDoux, 
1996).  Lastly, and most importantly for the present research, the fear module is proposed to be 
selective in that evolutionarily-relevant (i.e., ancient) threatening stimuli receive exclusive 
processing in the module.   
The concept of mental modularity as described by Fodor (1983) has received much 
criticism in past years (Barrett, 2005; Barrett & Kurzban, 2006; Carruthers, 2003; Frankenhuis & 
Ploeger, 2007; Geary & Huffman, 2002; Over, 2003; Sperber, 1994; Wagner, Pavlicev & 
Cheverud, 2007) which presents problems for the foundational ideas of Öhman and Mineka’s 
fear module.  However, aside from this broader debate on the validity of mental modularity, the 
present research focuses on a particular aspect of the theorized fear modules’ modularity namely, 
its selectivity.  Because recent studies have shown that modern threat stimuli seem to enjoy the 
same privileged processing as ancient threats, it is uncertain that the fear module is truly 
selective to phylogenetically relevant fear stimuli (e.g., snakes, spiders, etc.). 
 Evidence for the Fear Module’s Evolutionarily Derived Selectivity 
In support of a fear module developed from evolutionary pressures, Öhman and Mineka 
(2001) argue that the predators and other creatures that threatened the survival of our ancestors 
have privileged access to processing in the fear module.  Barrett (2005) stated that predators 
presented a steady end to which our minds have adapted to aid survival since the goal of 
predators has not changed over the course of evolution (e.g., eat other animals).  It is for this 
same reason that researchers believe such animals have such a prominent role in human fears 
(Arrindell, Pickersgill, Merckelbach, Ardon, & Cornet, 1991).  
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Empirical evidence for the fear module’s selectivity was provided in several experiments 
(Öhman, Eriksson, & Olofsson, 1975; Öhman, Fredrikson, Hugdahl, & Rimmö, 1978) which 
demonstrated that snakes and spiders were easier than other types of stimuli to associate with 
aversive shock.  Adding support to this position was the finding that once the associations of 
ancient threats with aversive shock were established, the associations were more resistant to 
extinction than associations established with other stimuli.  These findings were expanded by 
Cook, Hodes, and Lang (1986) who showed that images of snakes and spiders made better 
conditioned stimuli for predicting an electrical shock unconditioned stimulus than images of 
damaged electrical outlets.  Similar advantages for snakes and spiders as conditioned stimuli 
over neutral stimuli were observed with subliminally conditioned stimulus presentation (Öhman 
& Soares, 1993; 1998) suggesting that processing of phylogenetically relevant fear stimuli is 
extremely rapid.  Öhman and Mineka (2001) argue that ease of association of snakes and spiders 
with aversive shock is due to their privileged access to the fear module.  This access is said to be 
granted on the basis of their evolutionary relevance. 
Additionally, evidence from visual search paradigms suggests that evolutionarily relevant 
fear stimuli selectively capture visual attention.  This research shows that evolutionarily relevant 
fear stimuli such as snakes and spiders are detected faster among arrays of flowers and 
mushrooms than vice versa (Öhman, Flykt, & Esteves, 2001).  Also, angry and fearful faces are 
detected faster among neutral and happy faces than vice versa (Öhman, Lundqvist, & Esteves, 
2001).  Furthermore, once attention is allocated to evolutionarily relevant threats, these stimuli 
tend to hold attention (Rinck, et al., 2005).  Such evidence suggests that the visual attention 
system is automatically and selectively activated by threats that have become relevant through 
evolutionary selection processes.   
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The idea that evolutionarily relevant threat stimuli capture attention has also received 
support in other research paradigms.  Armony and Dolan (2002) used a variant of Posner’s 
(1980) cueing task using emotional pictures as cues to demonstrate an attentional bias to 
emotional content such as angry faces.  Emotional-neutral picture pairs were presented 
simultaneously and when the images offset, participants had to respond to a dot that appeared in 
the location previously occupied by the emotional or neutral picture.  The results demonstrated 
participants were faster to respond to the dot when it was in the location occupied by the angry 
face picture suggesting that attention had been sent to that location.  
 Evidence Against the Fear Module’s Evolutionarily Derived Selectivity 
As reviewed earlier, true Fodorian modular selectivity is thought to be determined by 
evolutionary processes (Fodor, 1983; Öhman & Mineka, 2001).  This implies that a fear module 
only processes evolutionarily relevant fear stimuli.  However, Brosch and Sharma (2005) used a 
visual search task (like that of Öhman and colleagues) to show the fear relevance of a stimulus in 
general, is more important for its attentional enhancement than is its evolutionary age.  Brosch 
and Sharma found the visual search reaction times (RTs) to phylogenetically relevant threats 
(e.g., snakes and spiders) were equivalent to ontogenetically relevant threats (e.g., guns and 
syringes).  Search RTs for both sets of stimuli demonstrated characteristics of efficient and 
parallel search (e.g., flat RT x set size search slopes) whereas search RTs for non-threatening 
stimuli did not. Images of mobile phones, cups, flowers and mushrooms served as control 
stimuli.  No evidence of efficient search was found for the control stimuli indicating that the 
threat value of the stimuli, in general, was responsible for the observed effects.  Brosch and 
Sharma (2005) concluded the fear module’s selectivity is not limited to evolutionarily relevant 
threats.  This conclusion was supported by Flykt (1999) who showed identical detection results 
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for both ancient and modern fear stimuli in a backward masking paradigm.  Taken together, 
these findings suggest the fear module may not be highly domain-specific (Sperber, 1994), 
acting on only ancient threats, but rather it appears to demonstrate less domain-specificity, acting 
on all types of threats. 
 Additional evidence for the domain-generality of the fear module was provided by 
Blanchette (2006).  Using the same visual search paradigm used in other studies (Brosch & 
Sharma, 2005; Fox, Griggs, & Mouchlianitis, 2007; Öhman, Flykt, Esteves, 2001; Öhman, 
Lundqvist, & Esteves, 2001), she demonstrated that search RTs for modern threats are just as 
fast, or faster than search RTs for ancient threats indicating that modern threats are just as good 
at capturing visual attention as ancient threats.  Specifically, in Experiment 1, she found that 
visual search RTs for guns and knives were significantly faster (by ~100 ms in a 2 x 2 grid and 
~50 ms faster in a 3 x 3 grid) than for snakes and spiders.  Blanchette concluded the 
phenomenological threat value of a stimulus (i.e., how threatening the stimulus was felt to be) 
was more important than its evolutionary age for eliciting a rapid behavioral response.  In 
Experiment 2, Blanchette provided an even more convincing demonstration of the flexibility of 
the fear module when she showed similar RTs for symbolic representations (i.e., cartoon 
renderings) of the same ancient and modern threats.  Furthermore, Van Rullen and Thorpe 
(2001) present evidence that animals and vehicles can be detected in images in less than 250 ms 
and that, in central vision, animals and vehicles are detected equally well.  Taken together, this 
evidence suggests an absence of perceptual biases for ancient over modern stimulus categories. 
 Also using a visual search paradigm, Fox, Griggs and Mouchlianitis (2007) demonstrated 
modern threats (e.g., guns) were detected just as quickly as ancient threats (e.g., snakes).  The 
unique contribution of their study was that they measured the threat-relevance of their stimuli, 
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and used this to predict attention capture.  This led Fox et al. (2007) to propose that the apparent 
equivalency between ancient and modern threats was due to the threat relevance of the stimuli, a 
phenomenon they termed the Relevance Superiority Hypothesis (Fox et al., 2007).  According to 
the Relevance Superiority Hypothesis, there is an early relevance evaluation system that 
proceeds on the basis of the personal goals and motivations of the individual.  Objects 
determined to be highly relevant (such as guns in modern day environments) enhance and 
modulate the amount of attentional processing dedicated to those particular stimuli thereby 
causing them to be detected more quickly than less relevant stimuli.  The Relevance Superiority 
Hypothesis predicts no difference in the detection speed of ancient and modern threats.  Thus, 
because both snakes and guns could threaten survival, both have the potential to be evaluated as 
highly relevant threatening stimuli and thus both can capture attention and receive similar 
processing.  
It is apparent from the reviewed literature that much (although not all) of the evidence 
demonstrating attentional capture by threatening stimuli has been gained through the use of 
visual search paradigms.  However, visual search paradigms are notoriously sensitive to the 
visual characteristics of the stimuli (Duncan & Humphreys, 1989; Lipp, Waters, Derakshan, and 
Logies, 2004).  Duncan and Humphreys (1989) outlined a theory of the effect of stimulus 
similarity on visual search outcomes.  According to Duncan and Humphreys, visual search target 
detection speed is determined by similarity among distractor stimuli, the similarity of the 
distractor stimuli with the target, and when using multiple targets, the similarity of the targets.  
Furthermore, similar targets are easier to detect and similar distractors are searched faster than 
dissimilar distractors.  Thus, researchers using visual search paradigms to understand visual 
7 
 
attention to threats should use stimuli that are as perceptually similar as possible in order to limit 
the contribution of stimulus visual characteristics such as size, shape, color, etc.  
Taking the work of Duncan and Humphreys (1989) into consideration, Lipp, et al. (2004) 
demonstrated that non-dangerous animals (e.g., domestic cats) among a visual array of flowers or 
mushrooms were detected just as fast as dangerous animals (e.g., tigers) among the same 
distractors.  This suggests that the visual disparity between animal and plant stimuli may be 
partly responsible for past research results showing speeded detection of threats in visual search 
arrays (see Öhman and Mineka, 2001). Importantly, Blanchette (2006) examined whether 
speeded detection of ancient and modern threats in visual search is due to their perceptual 
dissimilarity from their distractors.  Refuting this hypothesis, she showed that even when 
searching for a threatening target that is perceptually similar to its distractors (e.g., a grenade 
among balls or syringes among pens) both ancient and modern threats captured attention whereas 
their similarly shaped non-threatening counterparts did not.  Nevertheless, search for modern 
threats was, in fact, faster and more efficient than the search for ancient threats.  Such findings 
suggest that cognitive mechanisms for attention to threats can be modified by input from 
environment and are not hardwired to process strictly phylogenetically relevant threats.  
An additional issue arises from a conceptual consideration that has implications for fear 
and threat detection behavior. Given the mixed findings regarding the evolutionary constraints of 
the fear module and the Relevance Superiority Hypothesis proposed by Fox et al. (2007), it is 
plausible that the mixed results regarding threat detection are due in part to the personal 
relevance of both the ancient and modern threat stimuli.  How relevant a threat is to an individual 
could vary as a function of their personal experiences but also as a function of their goals.  In 
fact, one’s goals and motivations have been shown to affect attentional selection (Dijksterhuis & 
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Aarts, 2010; Yarbus, 1967) as have experiences with stimuli (Nodine et al., 1996).  Determining 
whether one’s personal experiences with threats factors into their visual processing is an 
additional aim of the present research.  Identifying participants’ experience levels with the threat 
stimuli used allows assessment of the influence of experience and personal relevance on threat 
detection behavior.  
Based on the work of Duncan and Humphreys (1989) which showed that visual search is 
sensitive to visual characteristics of searched stimuli and the work of Lipp et al. (2004) who 
showed a detection advantage for animals in general, it is possible past studies that have 
proposed attentional capture by evolutionarily-relevant threat animals (such as the work of 
Öhman and colleagues) may have simply demonstrated attentional capture by any category of 
animal.  However, Lipp and Waters (2007) showed that fear-relevant animals (e.g., spiders) seem 
to hold attention in visual search longer than perceptually similar fear-irrelevant animals (e.g., 
cockroaches).  Additionally, Blanchette (2006) showed that lions were detected faster among 
cats than vice versa.  Thus, the issue of how evolutionary relevance plays into the attentional 
capture by threatening stimuli is unresolved.  
 Overcoming the Limits of Visual Search With an Eye Movement Paradigm 
Given the mixed findings and the methodological issues of the visual search paradigm 
(e.g., Blanchette, 2006; Brosch & Sharma, 2005; Lipp et al., 2004; Duncan & Humphreys, 1989) 
it appeared the research regarding fear and threat detection could benefit from utilizing a new 
research paradigm.  Because eye movements are an ecologically valid and accurate index of 
covert attention (Henderson, 2003), eye movement paradigms seemed a suitable candidate for 
such research.  
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Important questions arise from the reviewed literature concerning the selectivity of the 
fear module.  Do ancient threats, modern threats or both activate the fear module?  Is it possible 
that both ancient and modern threats are equally good at capturing attention?  To what degree is 
the human fear response modified by environmental inputs?  To answer these questions, ancient 
and modern threats need to be put in direct competition for attention.  This would allow us to 
draw conclusions regarding the relative attentional enhancement and processing privileges of 
each type of threat.  Unfortunately, the methodological issues inherent in the visual search 
method are not well suited to address the problems in this fashion.  Therefore the present 
experiment used an oculomotor inhibition paradigm to assess whether ancient or modern (or 
both) threats capture attention during a saccade task.  In the oculomotor inhibition paradigm two 
images are laterally presented and the characteristics (e.g., angle, endpoint deviation and latency) 
of vertical saccades between the images are recorded (Nummenmaa, Hyönä, & Calvo, 2009).  
Because participants were instructed to ignore the images, the resulting involuntary curvature of 
the saccades (toward or away from the images) that resulted from inhibiting eye movements to 
the images served as an indication of which stimulus was capturing attention (Van der Stigchel, 
Meeter, & Theeuwes, 2006).  
The present experiment was conducted to determine whether neutral, ancient, or modern 
threat stimuli would capture attention when in direct competition for processing resources.  It has 
been shown repeatedly that when presented among non-threatening distractors both ancient and 
modern threats appear to capture and hold attention (Blanchette, 2006; Brosch & Sharma, 2005; 
Fox et al., 2007).  However, these two types of stimuli have not been put in direct competition 
within the same task.  In this experiment, by using the oculomotor inhibition paradigm described 
above we measured how attention was covertly captured by the three stimulus categories (non-
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threat, ancient threat, and modern threat) when put in competition for processing resources by 
presenting them simultaneously.  The data acquired indicate the relative strength of each type of 
stimulus for drawing attention and help to inform debates on the evolutionary constraints and 
malleability of the fear module and visual attention to threats in general. 
Research suggests that the emotional content of an image is available outside of foveal 
vision.  Calvo and Nummenmaa (2007) demonstrated that participants could reliably 
discriminate unpleasant from pleasant images when presented to the parafovea (i.e., 1-5 retinal 
eccentricity; Larson & Loschky, 2009).  This is possible because even when images are 
presented parafoveally, the magnocellular pathway provides coarse information to the amygdala 
that is sufficient for a rough analysis of stimulus valence (Mermillod et al., 2010; Vuilleumier, 
2005).  Furthermore, images presented parafoveally can also capture attention and affect the 
saccade generation system even when they are irrelevant to the current task (Nummenmaa, 
Hyönä, & Calvo, 2009). 
Nummenmaa et al., (2009) used an oculomotor inhibition paradigm to demonstrate that 
emotional scenes capture attention when presented parafoveally.  Framing their work within 
Tipper’s (1997; 2000) Population Coding Theory, Nummenmaa et al. demonstrated that 
emotional scenes capture attention by showing saccades deviate away from the emotional scenes.  
Research has shown that saccades can deviate towards or away from attention capturing stimuli 
and there are specific stimulus viewing conditions and theories for why one would expect 
saccades to deviate in one direction or another.   
 Saccadic Deviations Toward or Away From an Attention Capturing Stimulus 
Van der Stigchel, Meeter, and Theeuwes (2006) present evidence and theory explaining 
why saccades deviate towards or away from an attention capturing stimulus.  In particular, they 
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argue, saccade trajectories are influenced by stimulus factors such as size, luminance and sudden 
onsets as well as by the demands of particular tasks (Van der Stigchel, et al., 2006).  For 
example, deviations towards a distractor occur when the saccade target and the distractor are 
presented simultaneously or in close temporal proximity (e.g., 50 ms; Van der Stigchel, et al., 
2006).  On the other hand when stimulus onset asynchronies are longer (e.g., 200 ms) saccades 
will deviate away from attention capturing distractors (Van der Stigchel, et al., 2006).  
Tipper’s (1997, 2000) Population Coding Theory is the dominant theory for explaining 
saccadic deviations.  According to Population Coding Theory, potential saccade targets are 
represented by a large population of neurons that code saccade target locations as vectors.  These 
neuron populations are located in a motor map in the superior colliculus (Aizawa & Wurtz, 1998; 
McPeek, Han, & Keller, 2003; McSorley, Haggard, & Walker, 2006; Van der Stigchel et al., 
2006).  Furthermore, the response strength of the coded vector of the superior colliculus is 
positively related to the saliency of the target.  If two potential targets are in close spatial 
proximity, competition will arise among the population codes in the superior colliculus, 
sometimes resulting in a saccade to the “center of gravity” between the two stimuli (Van der 
Stigchel, 2006; Zelinsky, 2008).  In cases where participants are instructed to move their eyes to 
one location, one of the two potential targets must be inhibited to resolve the competition.  
Inhibition of one target over the other affects the saccade trajectory.  
 Tipper (2000) proposes location specific saccadic inhibition is conducted through two 
exclusive inhibitory mechanisms.  One of these mechanisms operates via lateral inhibition of 
neurons in the motor map.  The neurons in the motor map are retinotopically organized such that 
adjacent neurons in the superior colliculus code for adjacent locations on the retina.  Activity in a 
given location in the superior colliculus corresponds to saccade target locations.  Thus, activity in 
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the given location in the superior colliculus increases until a saccade is made.  The superior 
colliculus integrates the localized activity into a single output that is sent to premotor circuitry in 
the brainstem where eye movements are programmed (Moschovakis, 1996).  The initial saccade 
direction is determined by the activity in the superior colliculus but the cerebellum adjusts and 
corrects saccadic trajectory during flight (McSorley, Haggard, & Walker, 2004; Quaia, Lefe`vre, 
& Optican, 1999). 
The motor map neurons in the superior colliculus share excitatory connections with their 
neighboring cells and share inhibitory connections with distant cells.  Therefore, excitation of a 
given location in the motor map simultaneously inhibits distant locations.  This lateral inhibition 
is sufficient for inhibiting an eye movement to a distractor whose saliency is equivalent to the 
target.  However, if a distractor is highly salient and activity in the motor map is high for the 
distractor location then this mechanism is insufficient for resolving the saccade programming 
conflict.  In this case, a second mechanism operating via reactive feedback from the frontal eye 
fields (Houghton & Tipper, 1994) suppresses the motor map activity caused by the distractor.  
According to Tipper (2000) this mechanism’s inhibition is much stronger and is directly related 
to the saliency of the to-be-inhibited location.  Highly salient distractors cause greater inhibition 
of the corresponding neuron populations to sub-baseline levels resulting in saccadic trajectories 
that deviate away from the distractors.  Less salient distractors do not elicit reactive feedback and 
may instead cause deviations toward the distractor via the primary lateral inhibition mechanism.   
Projections from the frontal eye fields to the superior colliculi have an important role in 
the top-down inhibition of saccade target locations (Schlag-Rey, Schlag, & Dassonville, 1992).  
The top-down inhibition from the frontal eye fields suppresses the distractor-related activity in 
the superior colliculi below baseline resulting in a negative addition (Tipper, Howard, & Paul, 
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2001) to the averaged superior colliculus output.  This results in an initial saccade deviation 
away from the distractor location.  However, this reactive feedback from the frontal eye fields is 
only necessary for competing target locations of high salience. 
Saccade deviations away from distractors are observed when certain viewing conditions 
are met.  Specifically, deviations away are observed with longer saccade latencies (e.g., 200 ms) 
whereas shorter saccade latencies produce deviations towards distractors (McSorley et al., 2006).  
Additionally, predictable saccade target locations seem to produce deviations towards distractors 
(Van der Stigchel et al., 2006).  Population Coding Theory affirms that the onset of a distractor 
comes with inhibition of saccades to it.  The inhibition is a result of instruction not to make an 
eye movement to that stimulus.  According to the Premotor Theory of Attention (Rizzolatti et al., 
1987) an eye movement is programmed when attention shifts toward a stimulus, in this case the 
distractor.  But because the viewer knows that the saccade should not be executed, the inhibition 
affects the subsequent saccade resulting in saccadic trajectories that deviate away from the 
inhibited distractor location on their way to the target.  Thus the saccade starts by heading away 
from the distractor location but through the corrective influence of the cerebellum, the saccade is 
pulled back towards the correct saccade target resulting in a saccade trajectory which arcs away 
from the distractor location.  Furthermore, the more a distractor location attracts an eye 
movement, the more it must be inhibited.  Greater inhibition results in more dramatic deviations.  
Thus, greater deviation away from a given stimulus can indicate greater attention capture by the 
stimulus. 
As mentioned earlier, researchers (Godijn & Theeuwes, 2002; McSorley et al., 2004) 
have proposed that the frontal eye fields are a possible source of top-down inhibition of 
distractor locations.  The frontal eye fields have inhibitory connections to the superior colliculus 
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that run through the substantia nigra of the basal ganglia (Basso & Wurtz, 1997; 2002).  
Although behavioral data (Godijn & Theeuwes, 2002; McSorley et al., 2004) supports such a 
model, there is no neurophysiological evidence that the frontal eye fields inhibit areas of the 
superior colliculus during deviations away from the distractor.  This inhibition hypothesis would 
be supported by neurophysiological data showing that superior colliculus activity at the distractor 
location is inhibited below baseline during deviations away from the distractor.  However, 
despite the lack of confirming neurophysiological data, behavioral data have shown that longer 
saccade latencies produce deviations away in line with the idea that top-down inhibitory 
influences take time to affect the saccade program (Godijn & Theeuwes, 2002).   
 To summarize, saccadic deviations towards a distractor seem to be caused by unresolved 
competition between locations in the motor map of the superior colliculus.  Furthermore, 
deviations towards a distractor occur with stimuli of comparable saliency at early stimulus onset 
asynchronies and short saccade latencies.  Deviations away from the distractor arise from the 
inhibition of highly salient distractors, large stimulus onset asynchronies and long saccade 
latencies.  The long stimulus onset asynchronies and saccade latencies allow top-down 
influences sufficient time to inhibit motor map neurons coding for to-be-ignored locations below 
baseline. 
 Based on what we know about saccade trajectories and oculomotor inhibition, we have 
developed a methodology to investigate the evolutionary constraints imposed on visual attention 
to threat.  The investigation is reported in the sections that follow. 
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Chapter 2 - Experiment 1 
 Stimulus Presentation Parameters 
The present experiment adopts the same oculomotor inhibition paradigm used by 
Nummenmaa, Hyönä, and Calvo (2009) and is designed to meet the conditions under which 
deviations away from attention capturing stimuli can be expected.  Specifically, long stimulus 
onset asynchronies (e.g., 200 ms) will be used (Van der Stigchel et al., 2006) and by leaving the 
central fixation dot on the display, saccade latencies will be prolonged (McSorley et al, 2004; 
Van der Stigchel et al., 2006).  This should allow sufficient time for top-down inhibitory 
processes to take effect (Van der Stigchel et al., 2006).  Under these conditions, saccades should 
deviate away from the more salient of two laterally presented distractors (Van der Stigchel et al., 
2006).   
Previous research suggests that emotional stimuli are highly salient (Vuilleumier, 2005) 
and emotional content has been shown to capture attention (Nummenmaa et al., 2009).  Thus, in 
order to isolate the effect of the emotional content on attention, lower level stimulus salience due 
to luminance contrast will be controlled for by equating all stimuli for mean luminance and 
image contrast.  In this way, oculomotor capture should derive from the emotional content of the 
images rather than their luminance and contrast.  However, because previous research has not 
explicitly isolated the effects of emotional salience from salience derived from low-level image 
characteristics, we cannot be entirely sure that what has been determined “emotional salience” in 
past research is not confounded with low-level image characteristics.  Recall that highly salient 
images evoke strong reactive feedback inhibitory mechanisms responsible for causing saccade 
deviations away from an attention capturing stimulus.  This suggests the possibility that 
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equalizing image luminance and contrast may affect image saliency and subsequently, eye 
movement patterns. 
Additionally, in Experiment 1 all images were presented both in the normal upright 
position and inverted position.  Inverting the image disrupts semantic processing (e.g., Kelley, 
Chun &Chua, 2003) while maintaining the low level properties of the stimuli (e.g., spatial 
frequencies, orientations, phase, and contrast).  Thus, any effect of images’ emotional content 
should be reduced or eliminated during inversion if the effect is due to the emotional content of 
the stimuli and not due to low level stimulus properties (Gutiérrez, Nummemaa & Calvo, 2009).   
Using the oculomotor inhibition paradigm reported by Nummenmaa, et al. (2009, Exp. 
3), participants were presented with image pairs of ancient-, modern-, and non-threats on either 
side of a central fixation point (see Figure 2.1).  Participants were asked to make a saccade from 
the central fixation point to a saccade target positioned horizontally centered on either the top or 
bottom edge of the display.  By asking participants to make vertical saccades from the central 
fixation point and recording the eye movements, saccade trajectory served as a measure of 
whether one threat type reliably captured attention.  Because the Premotor Theory of Attention 
(Rizzolatti, Riggio, Dascola, & Umilta, 1987) posits that shifts of covert attention involve 
programming eye movements, and the Population Coding Theory posits that inhibiting an eye 
movement to an attention capturing stimulus causes saccades to curve away from it under the 
proposed conditions, in the present experiment attentional capture was indexed by saccadic 
curvature, saccadic latency and saccade endpoint deviation.  We also recorded data indicating 
when participants erroneously made saccades to a distractor.  These error data served as an 
additional measure of preferential looking and were also used to index attention allocation. 
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Figure 2.1  Trial schematic. In this hypothetical example the saccade curved away from the 
snake indicating the ancient snake threat captured attention and a saccade to that stimulus 
was inhibited. 
 
 
 
 Hypotheses 
The degree of saccadic curvature was calculated to explore whether the independent 
variables differentially and reliably affected saccades.  Specifically, because curving saccades 
indicate that the population of neurons responsible for programming an eye movement to the 
threat stimulus was inhibited below baseline (Godijn & Theeuwes, 2004) the degree of saccade 
deviation indicated the degree of neuronal inhibition with larger deviations indicating greater 
inhibition.  Thus, this measure allowed us to establish a rough picture of how attention is 
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allocated in the face of ancient and/or modern threats.  For example, when ancient and modern 
threats are put in competition for attention, is one or the other consistently winning out?   
 If the fear module contains the Fodorian characteristic of evolutionarily derived 
selectivity (Öhman & Mineka, 2001), we would expect the ancient threat stimuli to successfully 
compete for attention when paired with both neutral images and modern threats.  Such 
preferential attention capture for ancient threats would be indicated by saccades reliably 
deviating away from the ancient threat images but not the neutral or modern threat images and 
would suggest the fear module is constrained by evolutionary parameters.  On the other hand, 
recent research has shown that modern threats also capture attention (e.g., Blanchette, 2006).  If 
modern threats also activate the fear module we would expect saccades to curve reliably away 
from the modern threat stimuli.  Such a result would indicate the fear module’s selectivity is not 
constrained by evolutionary relevance. Of course it is possible no particular threat category will 
reliably capture attention.  In the event of an absence of a statistically significant effect of threat 
category or threat pair on saccade trajectories it would be important to consider why.  
If the lack of the effect is due to consistently straight saccades, then this would suggest 
that our stimuli are not capturing attention.  One potential reason this may occur would be if the 
images presented were too small or too close together (causing a global effect, see Van der 
Stigchel et al., 2006).  Revisions to the experimental program could fix this issue.  However, 
because the stimulus size and position is based on the work of Nummenmaa et al., (2009, Exp 3) 
this problem should be successfully avoided.   
A more interesting reason to observe a lack of effect of threat category on saccade 
trajectories is that the saccades curved, but they did not curve reliably away from one threat 
category or another since both threat types capture attention.  Because which specific images will 
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be paired with each other will be randomized, this could only indicate that the success of a 
stimulus to successfully compete for attention was dependent upon whether it was competing 
with a different type of threat or a neutral stimulus and that its effect was larger in that instance.  
This finding would further suggest that if the fear module exists, it does not exclusively select 
ancient threats for processing. 
Also, if we treat saccade latency as an independent variable, we can test to see if saccadic 
curvature varies as a function of saccadic latency.  According to Van der Stigchel et al., (2006) 
we may find that shorter saccade latencies result in saccade deviation towards the attention 
capturing stimulus whereas longer latencies may produce saccades that deviate away from the 
stimulus.  Additionally, we can conduct analyses to determine if a particular type of threat 
produced more misdirected saccades (e.g., to the image) than the other threat types.  This 
analysis serves as a measure of preferential looking, a known index of overt attention 
(Nummenmaa, et al., 2009). 
We can also make predictions based on participants’ experience with our stimuli.  
Specifically, because experience is positively related to attention to relevant targets (Nodine, 
Kundel, Lauver, & Toto, 1996) it makes sense that more experience with the stimuli would 
facilitate attention to it.  Thus, we would expect a main effect of experience such that those with 
more experience with the stimuli will demonstrate greater attentional capture by the stimuli as 
indicated by increases in saccade deviation.  We may also expect faster saccade latencies from 
more experienced participants.  Such results would implicate learning and experience in shaping 
fear and threat detection behavior.   
 Lastly, we expect a main effect of image inversion such that there should be less 
attentional capture with inverted images.  When images are inverted there should be a 
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diminished effect of threat pairing, or experience.  However, when the images are upright we 
expect a stronger effect of threat pairing and experience.  Thus, it is plausible that we will 
observe a three-way interaction between threat pair, experience and image orientation. 
 Method 
 Participants 
33 undergraduate students with varying experience with the threat categories used herein 
were recruited from Kansas State University to participate in the experiment in exchange for 
course credit.  Due to ethical considerations, all participants were warned of the potentially 
phobic and anxiety provoking nature of the stimuli at recruitment.  The main reason for 
measuring participants’ experience with the present threat categories is to gain insight into the 
degree of domain-specificity of some cognitive mechanism that allows experience to influence 
threat detection behavior.  
 Materials  
A Sloan near-acuity letter chart was used to ensure participants had normal or corrected-
to-normal vision.  Groups of participants were surveyed after completion of the experiment on 
their experience with, and anxiety caused by, the stimuli used herein using an adapted form of a 
specific anxiety questionnaire (SNAQ; Klorman et al., 1974; see Appendix A) that has good 
psychometric properties.  Participants were also tested for state and trait anxiety using the State-
Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, 1983; see Appendix B).  The experiment was 
conducted on a Dell computer running Experiment Builder ® software.  Eye movement data was 
acquired with an Eyelink 1000 (SR Research, Mississauga, Ontario, Canada) remote eye tracker 
with a sampling rate of 1000 Hz.  The stimuli were displayed on a 17-inch ViewSonic CRT 
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monitor with a gamma correction of 2.2 that took account of the perceptual compression of 
brightness. 
 Stimuli 
384 images collected from the International Affective Picture System (Lang, Bradley, & 
Cuthbert, 2005) and the internet that comprise the three threat categories (192 neutral images, 96 
images of ancient threats, and 96 images of modern threats) were used to create the neutral-
neutral, neutral-modern, neutral-ancient, and modern-ancient threat pair stimuli.  Each pairing 
included 72 trials of upright images and 72 trials of inverted images (72 images x 2 orientations 
x 4 pairings = 576 trials).  Each of the four pairings had one category on the left or right for half 
of the time (i.e., 36 of 72 trials had category X on the left and category Y on the right.  The side 
of presentation was reversed for the other 36 trials).  The images featured readily identifiable 
objects.  The ancient threat stimuli included images of snakes, spider, angry faces and dangerous 
mammals.  The modern threat stimuli included images of guns, knives, syringes and electrical 
hazards.  The neutral stimuli consisted of flowers, mushrooms, office supplies and dishes.  The 
images measured 9.5 cm x 7.1 cm (360 x 270 pixels) subtending 11.83º x 8.92º of visual angle at 
a fixed viewing distance of 58 cm.  All images were converted to grayscale and adjusted for 
equal mean luminance and RMS contrast.  Which image is presented to the left or right visual 
field was randomized and counter balanced so each threat type appeared equally often to the left 
and right of fixation.  Additionally, 24 images (12 Neutral, 6 Ancient, and 6 Modern) were used 
for 12 practice trials to familiarize participants with the task.  The practice images were not used 
in the main experiment.  
Similar to the methods used in Nummenmaa et al. (2009, Exp 3), the central fixation 
stimulus was a black dot with a white center with a diameter of 50 pixels (1.4 of visual angle), 
22 
 
and the saccade targets were black crosses measuring 50 x 50 pixels (1.4º of visual angle), 
centered on either the top or bottom edge of the display (see Figure 2.1).  Also similar to the 
methods of Nummenmaa et al. (2009), the location of all stimuli, including the distractor images 
and the saccade targets were marked on the initial trial screen with black rectangles that served 
as place holders. Whether the target would appear on the top or bottom was unknown, making 
the target location unpredictable.  This is one of the display conditions intended to push saccadic 
deviations away from distractors by allowing top-down processes to take affect the saccade 
program (Van der Stigchel, et al., 2006).  The center of the saccade targets was 11º from the 
center of the fixation dot.  The place holders for the images were the same size as the distractor 
images.  The inner-most edges of the images were located 5º from the center of the fixation dot, 
while the outermost edges were at 16.6, thus putting the distractor images within peripheral 
vision (> 5 eccentricity; Larson & Loschky, 2009).  Past research (Gutierrez et al., 2009) has 
shown that emotional content is available from peripheral vision. 
 Procedures 
Participants were tested individually in a dimly lit room.  Prior to starting the experiment, 
participants received a verbal warning of the potentially phobic and anxiety provoking nature of 
the stimuli.  Participants then completed the Sloan near-acuity letter chart vision test. Participants 
not scoring 20/30 or better were not allowed to participate.  After completing the vision test, 
participants completed the informed consent process and went through the eye tracker calibration 
procedure.  The calibration procedure required participants to fixate on a series of dots appearing 
randomly at nine positions on the monitor.  Following calibration, participants completed the 
practice task followed by the 576 experimental trials that took approximately one hour to 
complete.  Drift correction was performed after every trial to maintain calibration.  After the 
23 
 
experiment, participants completed the surveys. Participants were debriefed and thanked for their 
participation. 
 Tasks 
In the practice task, participants completed 12 trials (three trials from each of the four 
possible threat category pairings: Neutral-Neutral, Neutral-Ancient, Neutral-Modern, and 
Modern-Ancient) of the saccade task used in the main experiment.  Participants were required to 
make eye movements to the saccade target as quickly as possible after target onset.  In the main 
experiment participants completed 576 trials that started with the presentation of the central 
fixation dot.  To initiate the trial, participants pressed the “NEXT” button on a hand held game 
pad controller using their right hand.  The threat-pair images immediately onset followed 200 ms 
later by the saccade target.  The saccade target onset served as the imperative signal to initiate 
the saccade.  Participants were instructed to ignore the images and make vertical saccades to the 
target presented on the central vertical axis orthogonal (above or below) to the images and hold 
fixation until the end of the trial.  Consistent with the method of Nummenmaa et al. (2009, Exp. 
3) participants had 1,350 ms post-target onset to complete an eye movement to the saccade target 
after which time the screen went blank for 1,000 ms.  After the 1,000 ms blank screen a drift 
correction screen containing only the central fixation dot appeared.  Participants had to fixate the 
dot and press the “NEXT” button on the handheld gamepad to advance to the next trial.  This 
drift correction ensured proper eye tracker calibration throughout the experiment.  After drift 
correction, the next trial initiated as indicated by the appearance of the first trial screen 
containing only the central fixation dot and placeholders.  The total trial duration was 2,550 ms.  
An example trial is illustrated in Figure 2.1. 
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 Design 
The main independent variables in the experiment were a) the threat category pairing of 
the target images (4-levels: neutral-neutral, neutral-modern, neutral-ancient and ancient-modern, 
within-subjects), b) experience with the stimuli (2-levels: high or low, between subjects) c) 
image inversion (2-levels: upright & inverted (within-subjects), and d) anxiety created by the 
stimuli (2-levels: high or low, between-subjects (median split)), yielding a 4 x 2 x 2 x 2 mixed 
design.  Saccadic latency (i.e., the time required to initiate an eye movement), saccade angle and 
saccade deviation (i.e., the degree of saccade curvature in angular degrees) were the dependent 
variables used to index attention capture.  Additionally, misdirected saccades (i.e., saccades to a 
threat image) were recorded as an additional indicator of preferential looking which has been 
used to demonstrate attentional capture (Nummenmaa et al., 2009) and were analyzed separately.  
Based on previous research regarding our stimulus timing parameters (Nummenmaa et al., 2009, 
Exp. 3; Van der Stigchel et al., 2006), when forced to ignore the threat stimuli, participants’ 
saccades were expected to arc away from the attention capturing stimulus.  
 Results 
 Precursors to Analysis 
Trials were temporally filtered to focus on the period of interest between the onset of the 
images and termination of the trial upon target fixation.  Using this interest period, further data 
processing ensued in order to provide clean and analyzable datasets.  In line with the methods of 
Nummenmaa et al. (2009, Exp. 3) trials indicating anticipations, (saccade latencies < 80 ms) and 
retardations (latencies over two standard deviations above the participants’ mean) were removed.  
Saccade starts and ends were identified by Eyelink software utilizing a 22 deg/s velocity and 
8,000 deg/s
2
 acceleration criterion (McSorley et al., 2006).  Trials indicating saccades to the 
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wrong target were labeled as errors for separate analysis (Nummenmaa et al., 2009).  Saccades 
with an endpoint deviation greater than 4º from the center of the target were removed. 
Additionally, saccades with amplitudes less than 10º were labeled undershoots (Nummenmaa et 
al., 2009) and removed from the analysis.  In total, 33.6% of the cases were removed. The 
majority of the problem cases were undershoots (24.4%) resulting from short saccades around 
the viewing space during the interest period.  Further, 7.3% of the removed cases were from 
saccades landing more than 4º from the center of the target.  The final 1.9% of the removed cases 
was from saccades to the wrong target. In terms of trials, 19% of the trials were removed. This is 
substantially more than Nummenmaa et al. (2009, Exp 3) who only removed 8% of their trials.  
However, given that this experiment had 4.5 times the number of trials used in Nummenmaa et 
al., there was substantially more room for error. 
Further processing of the eye movement data was required to assign values to the 
saccadic deviations.  We recorded the X and Y coordinates for the eye at every millisecond 
during the interest period.  These data were used to calculate and assess the initial deviation 
angle of a saccade in the first 10 ms post-initiation.  Saccade angle deviation was calculated as 
the initial angle between the saccade sample points in the first 10 ms of the saccade and the 
straight path from fixation to the endpoint of the saccade (Van der Stigchel, et al., 2006).  The 
angles of the saccades were calculated by creating a straight line from the beginning and end 
points of a saccade.  This line then served as the abscissa.  Next, the slope of the line from point 
1 (eye location at 1ms) to point 10 (eye location at 10 ms) using the start-to-finish line as the 
abscissa was determined for each trial.  Taking the arc tangent of this slope produced an angular 
value which served as the dependent variable in the analysis.  This angle determination method is 
illustrated in Figure 2.2.  In addition to the statistical analyses of these data, plots of the data 
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points facilitate visual analysis of the data and clearly show consistent trends in eye movement 
behavior.  
Saccades deviating to the left were assigned negative values and saccades deviating to the 
right were assigned positive values.  The saccade angle values were divided by the values of 
saccade amplitude to account for potential effects of amplitude on saccade curvature.  This 
resulted in a saccade angle per amplitude ratio value that indicated both the direction and degree 
of the saccadic deviation (Nummenmaa et al., 2009). 
The endpoint deviation of the saccades (i.e., how far the first fixation after saccade 
initiation falls from the correct saccade target) was also calculated as a measure of saccade 
deviation (Nummenmaa et al., 2009).  This measure was also assigned negative and positive 
values for left and right deviations, respectively.  To account for the potential effect of saccade 
amplitude on endpoint deviation, the endpoint values were similarly divided by the saccade 
amplitude to obtain deviation per amplitude ratio value.  This resulted in a second value that 
represented the direction and degree of saccadic deviation (Nummenmaa et al., 2009). These 
values were then transformed to represent deviation in terms of visual angle
1
. 
As a third measure, saccade latency (i.e., the lag from target onset to saccade initiation) 
was recorded.  This variable was analyzed to provide information about processing speed.  
                                                 
1 We completed the transformation of the endpoint ratio values in accordance with the procedures used in 
Nummenmaa et al. (2009, Exp 3) in the interest of facilitating comparison across the two studies.  However, it 
would be more appropriate to establish the visual angle values of the raw endpoint deviations and saccade 
amplitudes first, and then calculate the deviation ratio using these transformed variables.  This logic is based on the 
idea that it makes more sense to establish real visual angle values in the two variables and use those to compute the 
deviation ratios.  Transforming a ratio derived from raw data into visual angle seems less appropriate as one is 
calculating the visual angle of a derived deviation measure, not an actual deviation measure that exists naturally.  
Although the two methods do not alter the data patterns, the method used here (and in Nummenmaa et al., (2009, 
Exp 3) does produce smaller values by an order of magnitude. 
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Specifically, saccade latency tells us whether or not processing speed is systematically related to 
the independent variables. 
The independent variables used in the following analyses were similar to previous 
analyses of saccade data.  Condition pairing (4 levels), stimuli orientation (2 levels), experience 
with the stimuli (2 levels) and anxiety caused by the stimuli (2 levels) were tested for their 
effects on the initiation angles of saccades, the endpoint deviations of the saccades, and the 
saccade latencies to determine if various threats were systematically affecting saccade 
programming.   
Figure 2.2 Determination of the initial saccade angles. 
 
Of note is the fact that there were 13 unique possible pairing combinations of the threat 
conditions when accounting for side of presentation.  Ancient, modern and neutral threats were 
paired such that each pairing combination occurred with equal frequency when counterbalanced 
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for orientation (i.e., upright or inverted) and hemifield of presentation (left or right).  In the 
present study, hemifield of presentation is not of theoretical interest and thus, for analytical 
purposes, threat pairing was collapsed into a six-level variable (i.e., all possible pairs of the three 
threat conditions).  Further, the redundant threat pairings in which ancient threats were paired 
with other ancient threats (and likewise for modern) were omitted from the analysis to facilitate 
interpretation of the results.  This resulted in a 4-level condition pairing independent variable 
(i.e., ancient-modern; ancient-neutral; modern-neutral; neutral-neutral). Given the three 
dependent variables of interest, several mixed ANOVAs were carried out. 
 Analyses 
 Overall Analysis 
The analysis of saccade initiation angles failed to reveal significant main effects of threat 
condition pairing, orientation or experience (all Fs < 1).  Even the Neutral-Neutral pairs did not 
differ statistically from Neutral-Threat pairs in terms of the degree of deviation they elicited.  
Although not statistically significant, there was a trend for Modern-Neutral pairs (M = 9.35, SE = 
3.493) to have a greater angular deviation than the Ancient-Neutral pairs (M = 4.856, SE = 
3.428) in terms of the angle per amplitude ratio measure, p = .12   
Threat pairing was further collapsed into a new, three-level variable for the number of 
threats shown (zero, one, or two threats present) and analyses were conducted to test for effects 
of threat presence on our dependent variables.  None of these analyses produced significant main 
effects or interactions (all Fs < 1).  This is potentially problematic because on the one hand, if 
there are meaningful trends in the data, the analysis is not sensitive enough to pick them up.  On 
the other hand, if there are no differences between presenting viewers with one-threat versus no-
threat categories, and therefore the present images, including the neutral categories, in general 
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produce equal attentional capture, or the lack thereof, and the threat value of the stimuli plays no 
meaningful role in shaping the data.  This potential problem is the basis for conducting 
Experiment 2, to gain evidence as to whether or not these results indicate a Type II error. 
Moving on, we measured the distance of the final saccade landing position from the 
center of the target (i.e., saccade endpoint deviation).  This deviation value was divided by the 
saccade amplitude to calculate an endpoint deviation by amplitude ratio.  These endpoint 
deviation ratios served as the dependent measure of attention capture in another 4 x 2 x 2 mixed 
ANOVA.  Neither threat pairing nor orientation showed systematic relationships with endpoint 
deviation ratios (Fs < 1).  However, we suspected that the lack of an effect of orientation may 
have been due to plausible orientation invariance of a number of our stimuli.  Specifically, the 
ancient threats of snakes and spiders and modern threats of knives and syringes do not have a 
correct upright orientation.  To test this hypothesis, trials presenting these stimuli were removed 
and the data were reanalyzed.  This revealed a significant main effect of orientation on endpoint 
deviation ratios, F(1, 292) = 5.706, p = .018, supporting the notion that the observed effects were 
not due to low-level image characteristics. 
 Analysis of the Effects of Experience 
We also investigated whether or not participants’ level of experience with the threatening 
stimuli would affect the level of attention capture elicited by those stimuli.  The global measure 
of experience with threats used for this analysis is comprised of significantly inter-correlated 
subscales.  The correlations among threat-experience scores can be found in Table 2.1 
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Table 2.1. Correlations among the experience scores of the different threats. 
  Snake Spider 
Dangerous 
Mammal 
Angry 
Faces Guns Knives Syringes 
Electrical 
Hazards 
Snake 1 .563** .153** .071** .181** .008 .017* .258** 
Spider  1 .151** .196** .091** .174** .121** .338** 
Dangerous 
Mammal 
  1 .129** .205** .205** .054** .141** 
Angry 
Faces 
   1 .088** .275** .352** .358** 
Guns     1 .367** .021** .292** 
Knives      1 .058** .481** 
Syringes       1 .227** 
Electrical 
Hazards 
              1 
*significant at the p= .05 level 
**significant at the p = .01 level 
 
Generally speaking, participants who had experience with one type of threat tended to 
have experience with the other threats. However, this was not the case with knives and snakes 
which were uncorrelated.  This is likely due people’s relative inexperience with snakes compared 
to their likely daily encounters with knives. Interestingly, the strongest correlation was between 
experience with snakes and experience with spiders, perhaps the two most evolutionarily 
relevant threats.  Given the large number of significant correlations of varying strengths, there is 
a lot of room for speculation on the underlying reasons for these relationships. 
Additionally, utilizing this general experience measure provides clues regarding the 
domain generality of any cognitive mechanism that allows life experiences to affect attention 
behavior.  Thus, using a global measure of experience we found that participants’ experience 
with the stimuli was significantly related to endpoint deviation ratios, F(1,474) = 5.767, p = .017, 
Cohen’s F = .092.  Planned t-tests showed that those with high experience scores (M = .909, SD 
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= .726) had greater endpoint deviations than those with low experience scores (M = .734, SD = 
.673), t(1, 488) = 2.72, p = .007, d = .25.  This effect did not interact with condition pairing (i.e., 
experience affected both ancient and modern threats similarly).  This lack of an interaction is 
expected since the global threat experience variable was collapsed across both ancient and 
modern threats.  These data are presented in Figure 2.3.  
Figure 2.3 Endpoint deviation as a function of experience and anxiety with threats.  Highly 
threat-experienced individuals demonstrated significantly more saccade endpoint deviation 
than those with less threat experience. The same pattern is seen with the anxiety measure.  
Error bars represent SEM. 
 
 
Experience led to shorter latencies and larger endpoint deviations and it was therefore 
important to further examine this pattern.  To this end, participants with high and low experience 
were compared on threat-neutral and neutral-neutral trials.  Experienced participants were always 
faster and exhibited greater endpoint deviations than inexperienced participants regardless of the 
condition pairing.  Importantly however, when only neutral-neutral pairs were selected, 
experienced participants remained faster and still exhibited larger endpoint deviations.  What this 
means is that the effect of experience on saccade latencies and endpoints is unrelated to the threat 
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value of the stimuli.  This lightly suggests a low level of domain-specificity of some underlying 
cognitive mechanisms that allow experience with objects to up-regulate attention to them.  
Furthermore, it is unclear what the observed effects of the experience variables mean in relation 
to the present research questions regarding the evolutionary constraints on threat perception.   
Nevertheless, one may argue that it is insufficient to utilize a global measure of 
experience since experience with say, electrical hazards, has little (if any) theoretical relation 
with experience with say, snakes, in terms of evolutionary principles.  This position suggests that 
it would be more theoretically appropriate to do analyses utilizing more specified measures of 
experience.  Therefore, the global experience measure was broken out in order to examine the 
effects of specific experiences with the stimuli (e.g., snakes) on the dependent variables of 
saccade latency, saccade endpoint deviation ratios and saccade angular deviation on trials when 
that particular stimulus type (e.g., snakes) was presented.  Analyses using the subscales of 
experience speak to the domain specificity of the underlying cognitive mechanisms allowing 
experience to affect attention processes.  It is critical to conduct these analyses for two reasons.  
First, solely using a global experience measure may be theoretically inappropriate (even though 
the threat subscales are intercorrelated).  Second, and more importantly, analyzing the 
relationship of specific experience scales to our dependent variables may provide evidence 
regarding the domain specificity (or lack thereof) of threat detection mechanisms.  This is critical 
as the determination of the magnitude of domain specificity is central to discussions of evolved 
cognitive mechanisms (Sperber, 1994). 
A series of one-way ANOVAs were conducted, selecting specific threats for each 
analysis.  For example, in the first test we selected only those trials in which angry faces were 
paired with a neutral stimulus.  Using a median split for experience with angry faces as the 
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independent variable, the ANOVA failed to reveal a significant effect of experience on any of 
the three dependent variables (all Fs < 1).  Similar tests were carried out for all eight of the threat 
categories (i.e, angry faces, predators, snakes, spiders, electrical hazards, guns, knives and 
syringes).  Each test yielded similar non-significant results.  Thus, in short, when accounting for 
the specificity of experience, it appears that experience is not meaningfully related to our indices 
of attention capture (i.e., saccade latency, saccade endpoint deviation ratios, and saccade angles).  
However, due to a significantly smaller number of cases in these analyses (relative to the 
omnibus ANOVAs), and the use of median splits for the independent variables, these results 
could indicate Type II errors.  
To test the possibility that the one-way ANOVAs simply lacked the sensitivity necessary 
to pick up relationships between the dichotomized experience measures and the eye movement 
parameters to their associated threats, we carried out a series of correlation analyses using 
continuous measures of specific types of threat experience to see if specific experiences were 
related to the eye movement variables.  As shown in Table 2.2, there were three significant 
correlations.  Experience with snakes demonstrated a relatively strong positive correlation with 
saccade endpoint deviation ratios, r = .409, p = .016, as did experience with spiders, r = .382, p = 
.026. Lastly, experience with spiders demonstrated a significant negative correlation to saccade 
latency, r = -.341, p = .049.  This suggests a couple of interpretations of the analyses up to this 
point.  
First, it suggests the possibility that the null effect yielded in the one-way ANOVA 
testing for effects of snake and spider experience on the eye movement variables (only in cases 
where snakes and spiders were paired with neutral images) may have been a Type II error based 
on using a median split.  Furthermore, it suggests two things about the significant effect of 
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general experience on endpoint deviation ratios found in the omnibus ANOVA.  It suggests that 
either a) the omnibus ANOVA indicates a Type I error resulting from the large number of cases 
considered or b) the effect is driven by the strong relationship between experience with snakes 
and spiders and endpoint deviation ratios such that the deviations increase with experience.   
If the effect of global threat experience on endpoint deviation ratios is driven by 
experience with snakes and spiders, then removing data from trials in which snake and spiders 
were presented should remove the effect.  That analysis revealed this was the case, F < 1, 
supporting the idea that the effect of experience on endpoint deviation ratios is driven by 
experience with snakes and spiders. 
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Table 2.2. Correlations of the specific threat experience measures with the dependent eye 
movement variables. 
 Experienced 
Stimulus 
Angle 
Deviation 
Ratio 
Saccade 
Latency 
Endpoint 
Deviation 
Ratio 
Snake .091 -.182 .409* 
Spider .253 -.341* .382* 
Dangerous 
Mammal 
.180 -.210 .122 
Angry Faces .086 -.316 .077 
Guns .042 -.024 .235 
Knives .223 -.085 .070 
Syringes .099 -.080 .172 
Electrical 
Hazards 
.011 -.099 .108 
* = significant at the p = .05 level 
** = significant at the p = .01 level 
This line of reasoning supports the possibility of a domain-specific (i.e., snake-specific 
and spider-specific) cognitive mechanism whereby experience with snakes and spiders can 
influence attention to them.  This interpretation is in line with the evolutionary notion of 
preparedness supported by the comparative fear studies showing that monkeys undergoing 
minimal exposure to snakes will elicit a large fear response to them (Cook & Mineka, 1989), as 
well as studies showing rapid observational conditioning to snake and spider stimuli (Mineka et 
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al., 1984).  However, these interpretations are offered cautiously in light of the mixed findings 
from the various analyses. 
 Analysis of the Effects of Anxiety 
In order to analyze any effects of participants’ anxiety levels on the dependent variables, 
we utilized a global measure of anxiety.  It is important to note that a global measure of anxiety 
was justified as not only were there significant correlations amongst the individual anxiety 
measures, but the global anxiety measure was also correlated with a previously validated and 
well known measure of global state-trait anxiety (STAI, Spielberger, 1983), r = .510, p < .001.  
Entering the global anxiety measure into the ANOVA revealed a highly significant effect 
of anxiety on endpoint deviations, F(1,474) = 19.30, p < .001, Cohen’s F = .18.  Those high in 
anxiety had larger endpoint deviations (M = .948, SD = .820) than those low in anxiety (M = 
.657, SD = .421), t(1, 488) = 4.699, p < .001, d = .45.  This is shown graphically in Figure 2.3.  
Although participants with less anxiety had longer saccade latencies (i.e., they were slower to 
react than those with high anxiety), this effect did not reach significance, F(1, 474) = 3.037, p = 
.08.  There were no other significant main effects and anxiety did not significantly interact with 
the other independent variables.  The lack of an interaction is contrary to what is excpeted, as 
one would expect anxiety to interact with the presence of threat (i.e., no effect of anxiety in 
neutral-neutral pairs).  However, given the high correlation of our anxiety measures with each 
other and with the STAI (shown in Table 2.3), our specific anxiety scales seem to be capturing 
an effect of generalized anxiety on eye movements to all stimuli, regardless of their threat value.  
This suggests that generally anxious individuals exhibit more erratic eye movements.  This 
finding is important so far as it shows that anxiety can affect eye movements.  But given that 
anxiety is unrelated to the present threat manipulation, it is unclear what this means for the larger 
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research questions regarding the evolutionary constraints on threat perception.  Furthermore, 
adapting the SNAQ for the present purposes seems to have detracted from its construct validity, 
leading it to become more of a measure of general anxiety than specific anxiety.  This may 
explain the lack of an interaction with the other independent variables. 
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Table 2.3. Correlations among the specific anxiety measures and with the STAI. 
  Snake Spider 
Dangerous 
Mammal 
Angry 
Faces Guns Knives Syringes 
Electrical 
Hazards STAI 
Snake 1 .074** .429** .283** .381** .498** .117** .222** .404** 
Spider  1 .198** .491** .356** .342** .082** .085** .250** 
Dangerous 
Mammal 
  1 .281** .106** .118** .065** .232** .361** 
Angry 
Faces 
   1 .289** .562** .211** .359** .385** 
Guns     1 .701** .106** .441** .314** 
Knives      1 .270** .173** .287** 
Syringes       1 .001 .069** 
Electrical 
Hazards 
              1 .322** 
** = correlation significant at the p = .01 level 
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In an attempt to clarify the relationship of anxiety with threats, as was done with the 
experience measure, the global anxiety measure was broken out and specific analyses were 
conducted in which threat-specific trials were selected for analysis.  A series of one-way 
ANOVAs using median splits on the specific anxiety sub-scales as the independent variable and 
the eye movement parameters as the dependent variable showed that the individual anxiety 
measures were unrelated to the dependent variables with one exception.  Anxiety caused by the 
predatory mammal stimuli was related to saccade latencies F(1,32) = 4.057, p = .05, such that 
those high in predatory mammal anxiety (M = 528.42, SD = 151.95) were slower to react than 
those low in predatory mammal anxiety (M = 507.34, SD = 95.3).  Given that this is the only 
threat that produced a difference, it is difficult to interpret this finding.  However, the absence of 
a significant effect of specific anxieties on endpoint deviation ratios suggests that the significant 
result mentioned above may be due in part to additional analytical power resulting from the 
inclusion of larger number of cases.  Therefore, any ideas drawn from the notion that anxiety 
affects saccade endpoints should be drawn very carefully in the context of this study.  Further 
research would be required to investigate the effects of both general and specific anxieties on eye 
movement reaction times in order to posit a more substantive conclusion.   
In a larger analysis model including experience and anxiety measures, endpoint deviation 
ratios were analyzed in a 4 (pairing, within-subjects) x 2 (orientation, within-subjects) x 2 
(experience, between-subjects) x 2 (anxiety, between-subjects) mixed ANOVA.  The 4-way 
model failed to show significant effects of threat pairing or orientation on endpoint deviations 
(all Fs < 1).  However, both experience, F(1,348) = 14.04, p < .001, Cohen’s F = .157, and 
anxiety, F(1,348) = 29.13, p < .001, Cohen’s F = .296, remained systematically related to 
endpoint deviations (though it remains unclear what this means at this time).  
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There was also a significant relationship between experience and anxiety.  Specifically, 
those with more experience with the stimuli reported less anxiety (M = 7.95, SD = 4.45) than 
those with less experience (M = 11.53, SD = 5.80), t(1,629) = 8.478, p < .001, d = .69.  As shown 
in Figure 2.4, the experience and anxiety factors exhibit a significant negative correlation, r = -
.356, p < .001.  This raises the possibility that experience may play a role in shaping overt 
reactions to threats such as anxiety.  However, this experiment was not designed to test such 
possibilities and additional research would be required to elaborate on this issue. 
The data were further analyzed to test for any effects of threat type, experience with the 
stimuli, anxiety invoked by the stimuli or orientation of the stimuli on saccade latency. Saccade 
latency was entered as the dependent variable in a 4 (condition pairing, within-subjects) x 2 
(orientation, within-subjects) x 2 (experience with the stimuli, between-subjects) mixed 
ANOVA.  The data showed that neither threat pairing nor stimulus orientation was related to 
saccade latency (all Fs < 1).  Participants’ experience level with the stimuli had a significant 
effect on saccade latencies, F(1, 474) = 24.85, p < .001, Cohen’s F = .206.  This relationship 
seemed to be driven by the fact that those with less experience had consistently longer saccade 
latencies than those participants with more experience who demonstrated significantly faster 
saccade latencies, t(1, 488) = 5.298, p < .001, d = .453, see Figure 2.5.  As previously noted 
however, specific measures of experience are unrelated to the dependent variables.  Therefore, 
this effect of experience on saccade latencies should be interpreted cautiously.  It is possible that 
the significant result here is simply due to a larger number of cases being considered in the 
analysis. Lastly, the participants’ experience levels did not interact with the other IVs (all Fs < 
1).   
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In a subsequent ANOVA, a median split on the global anxiety measure (e.g., a collapsed 
measure of all the inter-correlated specific anxiety scales) was used to test for any effects of 
threat type, anxiety invoked by the stimuli, or orientation of the stimuli on saccade latency.  
Saccade latency was entered as the dependent variable in a 4 (condition pairing, within-subjects) 
x 2 (orientation, within-subjects) x 2 (anxiety with the stimuli, between-subjects) mixed 
ANOVA. This analysis revealed no significant effects. 
Figure 2.4 The significant negative relationship between our adapted global anxiety 
measure and our global experience with threats measure. 
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Figure 2.5 Average saccade latency for the high and low experience-with-threat groups. 
Error bars represent SEM. 
 
Based on the work of Van der Stigchel et al., (2006), we had predicted that if we treated 
saccade latency as a dependent variable, it would be systematically related to saccade deviation.  
Specifically, we had predicted longer (i.e., slower) latencies would be related to deviations away 
from the attention capturing stimulus, whereas shorter (i.e., faster) latencies would be related to 
deviations toward the attention capturing stimulus.  We conducted t-tests to examine this 
predication.  First, we selected only conditions where a threat was paired with a neutral stimulus 
(i.e., ancient-neutral, neutral-ancient, modern-neutral and neutral-modern pairs).  The test 
showed that both the slowest 25% and fastest 25% of saccades in these conditions deviated away 
from the targets as indicated by saccade angle and endpoint deviations, resulting in no difference 
in saccade deviation between the two groups of saccade latency, all ps > .05. 
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 Subjective Visual Inspection of Eye Movements 
When studying eye movements, quantitative statistics do not always tell the whole story.  
It is both helpful and necessary to plot eye position data in order to visualize eye movement 
patterns under different conditions of threat pairing.  We determined through quantitative 
analyses that modern threats showed a non-significant trend to cause greater angular deviation of 
saccades than ancient threats when they were paired with a neutral stimulus.  By looking at plots 
of the eye positions, we can visualize how such a trend in saccade deviation is manifested.  
For example, by looking at Figure 2.6 which displays threat-neutral pairs, we can see 
error saccades were made more often to threatening stimuli.  More specifically, in the Ancient-
Neutral panel of Figure 2.6, error saccades were made almost exclusively to the ancient threat 
stimuli.  This plot can be compared against the plot of eye positions for neutral-neutral pairings 
presented in Figure 2.7.  It is apparent in Figure 2.7 that there is a much more even distribution 
of error saccades.  Furthermore, Figure 2.7 seems to show overall less deviation than the threat-
neutral pair plots in Figure 2.6 in terms of saccade angles and endpoint deviation.  
When collapsed across side of presentation, there are 2240 total trials each for Ancient-
Neutral and Modern-Neutral pairs.  In terms of saccades directly to the images, when looking at 
the first saccades made in these trials, 3% of the saccades went to the threatening stimuli and 2% 
went to neutral images.  When considering the percentages this difference does not appear 
meaningful.  In terms of raw numbers, when paired with neutral images, ancient threats attracted 
70 first saccades whereas neutral images only attracted 45.  Looks to modern threats 
outnumbered looks to neutral images by 58 to 46.  Therefore, although the percentages are the 
same, ancient images actually attracted more direct looks. 
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Figure 2.6 Eye positions for upright A) Ancient-Neutral, B) Modern-Neutral, C), Neutral-
Ancient and, D) Neutral-Modern threat pairings.  All saccades portrayed in upward 
direction starting from the abscissa. The names of the plots indicate in which side each 
threat category is contained. For example, an Ancient-Neutral plot is comprised of trials 
where ancient images were on the left and neutral images were on the right. You can see 
from this figure that error saccades appear to have been made more often to threatening 
stimuli when paired with neutral stimuli.  
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Figure 2.7 Eye position plot for upright Neutral-Neutral pairs.  There appears to be 
relatively equal deviation for angle, endpoint and error saccades measures. However, this 
interpretation is purely from visual observation and statistical analyses should be regarded 
as the objective measure. 
 
Eye position plots for every condition pairing are presented in Appendix C. To expand on 
our visual inspection of the data, we can look at these plots to look for emerging patterns, 
keeping in mind that the patterns mentioned here result from subjective observations made by 
one person.  They are not intended to be an objective description of the data patterns but rather, 
food for thought. For example, Neutral-Ancient and Neutral-Modern threat pairings seem to 
show angular deviation away from the threat regardless of its evolutionary age (i.e., the samples 
seem to deviate more heavily to the left).   
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Still more suggestive patterns can be found in the eye position plots that were not 
identified in quantitative analysis.  The analyses above consistently suggest that the orientation 
of the stimuli was not affecting eye movements.  For example, when Ancient-Neutral threat 
pairings were selected, upright images (M = 139.1, SD = 26.37) showed a non-significant trend 
toward a greater angular deviation than inverted images (M = 138.7, SD = 26.3).  Although we 
expected a stronger effect of orientation with Ancient than with Neutral images, the t-tests did 
not yield significant differences and therefore we found no significant effect of the orientation IV 
on saccade deviation measures. 
The inverted eye position plots found in Appendix C may suggest something contrary.  
Subjective inspection of these eye position plots gives a slight impression that for a given 
condition, saccade deviation was generally less for its inverted counterpart.  Error saccades for 
the inverted counterpart also decreased. For example, considering trials presenting Ancient-
Neutral pairs, saccades directly to the threat decreased from 4% of the trials, to 3% of the trials 
when the images were inverted.  Similarly, error saccades to the threat in Neutral-Ancient pairs 
decreased from 4% to 2% with inversion.  For Modern-Neutral pairs inversion brought a 
decrease from 4% to 2%.  The Neutral-Modern pairs showed no appreciable decrease in error 
saccades between the upright and inverted images.  These patterns might suggest that even 
though the statistical analyses may not have been sensitive enough to detect the effect, rotating 
images 180 degrees may have detracted from their ability to capture attention.  However, it is 
again worth advising caution in interpreting the raw data plots as subjective interpretations have 
known limitations.  Furthermore, the 2% drop in errors with inversion is not a large decrease. 
One last pattern may be emerging by examining the density of points in the overall 
Threat-Neutral plot shown in Figure 2.8.  It appears that threats, in general may have attracted 
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more error saccades.  The areas outlined with red rectangles show where the actual distractor 
images were located.  The areas outlined with green triangles show the saccade paths of when 
participants moved their eye from the distractor to the target.  You can see that the density of the 
points contained in these interest areas is slightly greater on the “threat” side.  This may be an 
early indication of a threat superiority effect whereby threats capture attention regardless of their 
evolutionary age.  This interpretation is in line with the Relevance Superiority Hypothesis of Fox 
et al. (2007).  Again, this conclusion is offered cautiously given the lack of supporting statistical 
analyses.  Furthermore, this figure shows even neutral images are capable of capturing attention 
since there is not a total absence of saccades curving away from the neutral side. 
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Figure 2.8. The overall Threat-Neutral plot.  Threats are presented on the left half and 
neutral images on the right half.  All saccades have been rotated to be upward from the 
abscissa.  There is the slight appearance of a higher density of eye samples on the side 
containing the threats.  This may suggest that threats in general, regardless of their 
evolutionary age, capture more error saccades.  However, there are no statistical analyses 
supporting this conclusion.  Furthermore, there is not a total absence of errors on the 
neutral side.  This shows that even neutral images are capable of capturing attention. 
 
Because the side of threat presentation was counterbalanced, there were conditions in 
which one condition was presented on the left and another was on the right.  The counterpart of 
this condition presented images vice versa.  Thus, by transforming one condition, the eye 
samples have been moved to allow us to collapse across the left-right factor.  These new 
combined plots are presented in Appendix D and display all eye positions for a given pair of 
threat stimuli, regardless of their side of presentation.  For example, data from Neutral-Ancient 
pairs was mirror-transformed such that the eye position samples on the right half of the vertical 
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monitor midline are now on the left.  Looking at these plots, it becomes harder to discern a 
pattern of eye movements due to the amount of noise, and the density of the plots resulting from 
combining the conditions.  However, plots of ancient-modern image pairs seem to show that both 
ancient and modern threats have similar capability to capture attention although this is merely a 
subjective offering. 
 Discussion: Experiment 1 
Experiment 1 asked two questions. 1) Is the fear module constrained by evolutionary 
influences and, 2) can the fear module and subsequently observable human behavior relative to 
threatening stimuli be shaped by experience?  Given the data resulting from the present study, a 
tentative position can be taken in addressing these interesting theoretical and practical issues. 
In answer to question one, perhaps one relevant outcome of the present study is the lack 
of a clear attentional bias when ancient and modern threats were pitted against each other.  This 
null result lightly suggests that modern threats, like ancient threats, are selected for access to the 
automatic attention system that is an integral part of the fear module.  However, due to the lack 
of a statistically significant difference in saccade trajectories between the threat and no-threat 
(i.e., neutral-neutral) conditions, this interpretation must be taken as tentative and preliminary at 
best.  Furthermore, due to the large number (576) of trials in Experiment 1 it was necessary to 
ensure that the failure of our main manipulation to significantly affect eye movements was not 
simply an order effect as a result of subject fatigue, desensitization, learning or a practice effect. 
To test these hypotheses, we conducted a multi-level analysis to examine whether there were 
changes in the dependent variables as a function of trial.  The multi-level analysis was chosen 
because it allows analysis of the data without aggregation as is required in other types of 
analyses.  Analyzing the un-aggregated data allowed the ability to account for within-subjects 
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variance when assessing effects of independent variables on multiple observations of the 
dependent variables from different subjects.  Although we are primarily interested in data 
patterns as the experiment progressed, the multi-level model simultaneously assesses the effects 
of all of the independent variables allowing all of the extraneous variance to be accounted for.  
Therefore, all independent variables were assessed for interactions with the independent variable 
of interest.  The analysis yielded only one significant main effect of trial on saccade latency, F(1, 
32) = 14.91, p < .001, Cohen’s F = .229.  Saccade latencies tended to speed up as the experiment 
progressed.  This is inconsistent with the fatigue hypothesis in which we would expect longer 
saccade latencies as the experiment progressed. However, this result is consistent with a learning 
hypothesis as well as with a practice effect. Given these findings, it is plausible that the failure of 
Experiment 1 to demonstrate an attention bias was due, at least in part, to the practice effect that 
developed during the 576 trials.  Based on this analysis, future research must necessarily 
minimize the number of experimental trials which may require simpler experimental designs.  
Nevertheless, if the position that ancient and modern threat activates the fear module has 
some degree of truth (as speculated from subjective visual inspection of the eye position plots), it 
has theoretical implications.  For instance, it would eliminate the possibility of a hardwired, un-
modifiable, selective and encapsulated threat attention system such as that proposed in Öhman 
and Mineka’s fear module and would suggest that if the fear module exists, both ancient and 
modern threats enjoy processing by it.  Further, the present data are not completely clear as to 
whether ancient and modern threats capture attention to a greater extent than neutral imagery.  
Therefore, more research is undoubtedly needed in order to speak as to whether modern threats 
receive processing similar to ancient threats at some point along the visual stream.   
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In answer to the second question of Experiment 1, it was found participants with greater 
scores on the global experience scale demonstrated greater endpoint deviations and were faster to 
respond.  At first, this result seems counter intuitive, as one may naturally expect experience to 
breed accuracy (possibly through desensitization).  Contrarily, this result suggests that 
experience with all of the stimuli (recall the subscales were significantly correlated with one 
another) led to greater attention capture by them.  Thus, even if the fear module is automatic and 
encapsulated in that its behavior is out of conscious cognitive control, the attentional processes 
supposed to be born from this module may be affected by some cognitive mechanism that up-
regulates attention to stimuli on the basis of experience.  This notion is supported by the strong 
correlation between experience with snakes and saccade deviation on trials presenting snakes 
with neutral images.  This relationship suggests that such a cognitive mechanism is domain 
specific such that experience with snakes can influence attention processes in their presence.  
However, this conclusion is offered cautiously given that the ANOVAs utilizing experience 
subscales did not systematically affect saccade latencies or endpoint deviation ratios.  More 
research is necessary to clarify the existence or absence of this cognitive mechanism and whether 
specific experience truly affects attention to threats. 
Highlighting caution, it is noteworthy that experience was related to saccade deviation in 
both the omnibus ANOVA and the correlation analysis showing snake experience was strongly 
correlated with saccade deviation.  These findings are consistent with the findings of Nodine et 
al. (1996), who showed that experience with stimuli results in facilitated attention to the stimuli. 
It is possible that the role of experience in fear behavior is to serve to sensitize individuals to the 
presence of threatening stimuli (perhaps via the aforementioned attention up-regulating cognitive 
mechanism).  This is the idea of biological preparedness outlined by Öhman and Mineka (2001).  
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Still, it is arguable as to whether or not the present findings are consistent with an evolved fear 
module.  On the one hand you would not expect experience to affect attention capture through a 
fear module that is supposed to strictly selective of phylogenetically relevant threats.  On the 
other hand however, studies that demonstrated lab raised monkeys fear response to snakes 
argued for innate fear mechanisms; but these studies required monkeys to have at least minimal 
prior exposure to snakes in order to demonstrate the fear response (Cook & Mineka, 1989). This 
implies that evolutionary influence on threat detection is to inherently prime threats for rapid 
learning through some cognitive mechanism, in line with the evolutionary notion of preparedness 
(Öhman & Mineka, 2001).  Furthermore, the preparedness argument is in line with the work of 
Öhman et al., (1975) who demonstrated extremely rapid conditioning of fear responses using 
snake and spider stimuli.  Thus, there is a body of work that supports the idea that the influence 
of experience is not a separate issue from evolutionarily derived behavior.  Indeed, common 
sense suggests that from an evolutionary standpoint, such biological preparedness would be 
highly beneficial.  Although the present data cannot clearly inform this issue, it is an intriguing 
possibility. 
In addressing question two, namely whether or not experience could shape attention to 
threats, we also revealed that saccade latency was negatively related to participants’ scores on 
the global experience scale.  In other words, individuals with more experience with the range of 
stimuli were generally faster to react to the onset of the target in the presence of threatening and 
non-threatening stimuli.  The faster latencies of the these participants adds a little more support 
to the notion that experience may lead to sensitization which, in turn, could facilitate registration 
of the threat (or non-threat) in the motor map of potential saccade targets.  Although the 
limitations of the present data deem this notion speculative at this point, such early registration 
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would be evolutionarily beneficial in that it would allow more rapid programming of eye 
movements and expedite saccades to relevant targets.  However, at present, these data simply 
suggest that people who report to have more experience with a wide array of threatening stimuli 
make faster eye movements in general. 
Global anxiety scores were negatively related to saccade latencies.  In other words, more 
generally anxious participants demonstrated faster reaction times.  We had originally expected 
that anxiety would interact with threat pairing since anxiety should only affect attention to 
anxiety provoking stimuli.  However, it appears that our specific anxiety measure seems to be 
measuring general anxiety.  In fact, the specific anxiety measure is highly correlated with the 
STAI, an established measure of general anxiety.  Therefore, this finding suggests that 
generalized anxiety speeds saccade reaction times.  It follows then, that the present data do not 
allow us to draw conclusions regarding the effect of specific anxieties on attentional processes.  
It is noteworthy that this data pattern is the same with the global experience measure.  This is 
apparently contradictory since global anxiety and global experience scores are negatively related.  
Explanations for this paradox are offered below but to allude to that section, it likely stems from 
limitations of the self-report measures. 
Furthermore, global anxiety had a significant effect on endpoint deviations with high 
anxiety individuals producing greater endpoint deviations.  This demonstrates a higher degree of 
attention capture by those participants considered to be generally anxious.  If our measure of 
specific anxiety demonstrated greater content validity, this result would be in line with past 
research that showed anxiety is related to attention capture by the anxiety provoking stimulus 
(Lipp et al., 2004; Öhman et al., 2001).  However, the limitations of our anxiety scale only allow 
us to pose the conclusion that general anxiety may lead to large endpoint deviations. 
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Chapter 3 - Experiment 2 
 Although interesting data emerged in Experiment 1, conclusions as to the lack of 
selectivity of the fear module were made on the basis of null results in the omnibus ANOVA.  
This is clearly problematic as one could argue that the null findings were not due an equivalent 
ability of ancient and modern threats to capture attention, but rather, to a failure of the paradigm 
to elicit and capture differences in the saccade trajectories.  Or further, the lack of differences 
may have been due to a lack of sensitivity of the analyses to capture meaningful differences.  In 
order to determine whether the results of Experiment 1 were due to a Type II error or not, it is 
important to verify that the foundational research upon which Experiment 1 was based is able to 
demonstrate reliable effects.  Therefore, the reliability of the findings of Nummenmaa et al. 
(2009, Exp 3) must be determined.  To this end, Experiment 2 was an exact replication of 
Nummenmaa et al. (2009, Exp. 3) in every meaningful detail.  
If the ability of emotional images to capture attention outlined in Nummenmaa et al. 
(2009, Exp. 3) was due to a Type I error, it would explain the failure to find differences in 
Experiment 1 here.  Conversely, if the results of Nummenmaa et al. (2009, Exp. 3) are replicable, 
then the lack of a statistically significant effect of threat category in Experiment 1 could have 
arisen from various sources.  In either case, understanding the reliability of the attention bias to 
emotional content must be understood if the present data are to be properly interpreted.  The goal 
of Experiment 2 is to achieve this understanding through a careful and exact replication of 
Nummenmaa et al. (2009, Exp. 3). 
The overarching hypothesis tested in Experiment 2 is that emotional imagery captures 
attention.  This attention capture will be indexed by saccade trajectories arcing away from the 
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visual field that contains the emotional stimuli.  Confirming this hypothesis would replicate the 
findings of Nummenmaa et al., (2009, Exp 3). 
A successful replication of Nummenmaa et al., (2009, Exp. 3) would suggest that the 
oculomotor inhibition paradigm is effective at indexing attention bias (as manifested in saccade 
curvature) in emotional-neutral picture pairs.  Therefore, this would mean that the ability of 
emotional images to influence saccade trajectories did not generalize to the methodology used in 
Experiment 1.  On the other hand, a failure to replicate the findings of Nummenmaa et al., (2009, 
Exp. 3) would make interpretation of the lack of an attentional bias in Experiment 1 much 
simpler.  Because a failure to replicate Nummenmaa et al. (2009, Exp. 3) would indicate a Type I 
error on their part, the simplest explanation for the lack of an attentional bias in Experiment 1 
would be that there is no true attention bias for emotional content in oculomotor inhibition 
paradigms as used in the present research.  This would easily explain the failure of Experiment 1 
to find any effect of threat pairing.   
For ease of comparison, the key methodological details of Nummenmaa et al. (2009, Exp. 
3) and Experiments 1 and 2 can be seen in Tables 3.1 and 3.2, respectively.  Table 3.2 shows that 
the method of Nummenmaa et al. (2009, Exp 3) was replicated carefully in every meaningful 
detail.  Table 3.3 shows that the design of Experiment 2 is also a very careful replication of 
Nummenmaa et al. (2009, Exp 3). 
 Method 
The method used in Experiment 2 was a replication in every meaningful detail of 
Nummenmaa et al. (2009, Exp. 3) except where impossible (e.g., type of computer monitor) or 
well-motivated and unlikely to bias the results (e.g., the use of a fixation failsafe for trial 
initiation).  As can be seen in table 3.2, all methodological details of Nummenmaa et al. (2009, 
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Exp. 3) have been replicated in Experiment 2 in great detail so as to facilitate discussion of 
differences between Experiments 1 and 2.
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Table 3.1 Comparison of the key methodological details of Nummenmaa et al. (2009, Exp. 3) and Experiment 1 
  Nummenmaa et al. (2009, Exp. 3) Experiment 1 
Participants N = 15 N = 33 
Stimuli: content 
IAPS images:  Neutral pictures: 2037, 2102, 2190, 2191, 2191.1, 2200, 
2220,2221, 2270, 2272, 2272.1, 2305, 2312, 2312.1, 2357, 2372, 
2383,2389, 2393, 2393.1, 2394, 2396, 2397, 2397.1, 2410, 2491, 
2493,2512,  2513,  2513.1,  2515,  2560,  2560.1,  2575,  2575.1,  
2579,2593, 2593.1, 2594, 2594.1, 2595, 2595.1, 2598, 2598.1, 
2635,2635.1, 2745.1, 2745.2, 2749, 2749.1, 2840, 2850, 2870, 5410, 
7493, 7496, 7496.1, 7550, 7550.1, 7620, 7620.1, 9070, 9210, and 9210.1.  
Unpleasant pictures:  2399,  2399.1,  2683,  2691,  2703,2716, 2718, 
2722, 2799, 2800, 2811, 2900, 3051, 3180, 3181,3225, 3300, 3350, 6010, 
6250, 6313, 6315, 6550, 6560, 8480,8485, 9250, 9254, 9410, 9415, 9423, 
and 9435.  Pleasant pictures:2040, 2070, 2160, 2165, 2311, 2332, 2352, 
2540, 2550, 4599,4610, 4624, 4647, 4658, 4660, 4669, 4676, 4680, 4687, 
4694,4700, 5621, 5831, 5836, 7325, 8021, 8080, 8161, 8186, 8200,8490, 
and 8499. 
Images collected from IAPS and the 
Internet 
Stimuli: image alteration None, full color 
Grayscale, equalized for mean luminance 
and RMS contrast 
Stimuli: image size 10.24º x 7.68 º 11.93º x 8.92 º 
Stimuli: viewing distance Not available 58 cm 
Display  Black background, white placeholders, 20” monitor 
Grey background, white placeholders, 
17” monitor 
Procedure: SOA 0 ms, 150 ms 200 ms 
Procedure: # of trials 128 576 
Procedure: trials blocked? Yes No 
Random delay at trial start? Yes No 
Procedure: inversion 
variable? 
No  Yes 
Sampling rate 500 Hz 1000 Hz 
Trial initiation Experimenter initiated when felt subject fixated centrally Fixation failsafe, subject initiated 
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Table 3.2. Comparison of the key methodological details of Nummenmaa et al. (2009, Exp. 3) and Experiment 2 
  Nummenmaa et al. (2009, Exp. 3) Experiment 2 
Participants N = 15, 10 Female, M age = 23 N = 15, 4 Female, M age = 25.7 
Stimuli: content 
IAPS images:  Neutral pictures: 2037, 2102, 2190, 2191, 
2191.1, 2200, 2220,2221, 2270, 2272, 2272.1, 2305, 2312, 
2312.1, 2357, 2372, 2383,2389, 2393, 2393.1, 2394, 2396, 
2397, 2397.1, 2410, 2491, 2493,2512,  2513,  2513.1,  2515,  
2560,  2560.1,  2575,  2575.1,  2579,2593, 2593.1, 2594, 
2594.1, 2595, 2595.1, 2598, 2598.1, 2635,2635.1, 2745.1, 
2745.2, 2749, 2749.1, 2840, 2850, 2870, 5410, 7493, 7496, 
7496.1, 7550, 7550.1, 7620, 7620.1, 9070, 9210, and 9210.1.  
Unpleasant pictures:  2399,  2399.1,  2683,  2691,  
2703,2716, 2718, 2722, 2799, 2800, 2811, 2900, 3051, 3180, 
3181,3225, 3300, 3350, 6010, 6250, 6313, 6315, 6550, 6560, 
8480,8485, 9250, 9254, 9410, 9415, 9423, and 9435.  
Pleasant pictures:2040, 2070, 2160, 2165, 2311, 2332, 2352, 
2540, 2550, 4599,4610, 4624, 4647, 4658, 4660, 4669, 4676, 
4680, 4687, 4694,4700, 5621, 5831, 5836, 7325, 8021, 8080, 
8161, 8186, 8200,8490, and 8499. 
IAPS images:  Exactly the same as Nummenmaa et al. 
(20009, Exp. 3) 
Stimuli: image 
alteration 
None, full color 
Resized to match size at 58 cm viewing distance, full 
color 
Stimuli: image size 10.24º x 7.68º Exactly the same 
Stimuli: viewing 
distance 
Not available 58 cm 
Display  Black background, white placeholders, 20” monitor Black background, white placeholders, 17” monitor 
Procedure: SOA 0 ms, 150 ms Exactly the same 
Procedure: # of trials 128 Exactly the same 
Procedure: trials 
blocked? 
Yes Exactly the same 
Random delay at trial 
start? 
                                          Yes Exactly the same 
Inversion variable? No  Exactly the same  
Sampling rate 500 Hz Exactly the same 
Trial initiation 
Experimenter initiated when felt subject fixated 
centrally 
Fixation failsafe, subject initiated 
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 Participants 
 As in Nummenmaa et al., (2009, Exp. 3), 15 college students (11 male, Mean age = 25.7) 
volunteered to participate in Experiment 2. 
 Stimuli, display and apparatus 
The same stimulus displays used by Nummenmaa et al., (2009, Exp. 3) were used in 
Experiment 2.  All aspects of the display were identical. The same images used in Nummenmaa 
et al. (2009, Exp. 3)  were taken from the International Affective Picture System (Lang et al., 
2005) and measured 10.24º x 7.68 º of visual angle.  As in Nummenmaa et al. (2009, Exp. 3) the 
images were presented with the constraints that each image was used twice.  If it was presented 
on the left in block one, it would be presented on the right in block two.  An additional constraint 
was that each image was never paired with the same image twice. 
Just like Nummenmaa et al., (2009, Exp. 3) , the images were marked on the trial screen 
by a white box measuring 10.54 º x 7.98 º of visual angle.  The inner edges of the image areas 
were 2.5 º of visual angle from the center of fixation.  The central fixation point was a white dot 
with a black center measuring 1.5 º in diameter.  The saccade targets were white crosses 
subtending 1.5 º located on the central vertical axis of the screen.  The position on the trial start 
screen was marked with white squares subtending 1.6 º of visual angle.  The background color of 
all screens was black.  All screen layout parameters were exactly the same as in Nummenmaa et 
al., (2009, Exp 3). 
The recording apparatus was the same as in Experiment 1with one exception.  Instead of 
a 1000 Hz recording rate, the recording rate in Experiment 2 was 500 Hz in order to be 
consistent with Nummenmaa et al. (2009, Exp. 3). 
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 Procedure 
Because Experiment 2 is intended to be as close to an exact replication of Nummenmaa 
et al. (2009, Exp. 3) as possible, just as in Nummenmaa et al. (2009, Exp. 3), upon arrival all 
participants were required to score 20/30 or better on near acuity tested using a Sloan letter chart 
to qualify to participate in the study.  Participants were told they were participating in an 
experiment to see how fast and accurately they could fixate the target.  They were instructed to 
ignore the images and move their eye to the cross when it appeared.  
Each trial started with a drift correction screen to ensure the quality of the eye tracker 
calibration as was done in Nummenmaa et al., (2009, Exp. 3).  One point of departure from 
Nummenmaa et al. (2009, Exp. 3) is in the trial initiation mechanism.  In Nummenmaa et al., 
(2009, Exp. 3) the experimenter initiated the trial when they felt the subject was fixated in the 
center.  In this experiment, this potential source of experimenter error was removed by 
implementing a fixation failsafe.  With this failsafe, the trial was initiated by the subject pressing 
a button, but the trial would not initiate if their point of gaze was not contained in a 1 º bounding 
box in the center of the screen at the time of the button press.  However, there was a random 
delay of 0-100 ms appended to the beginning of each trial to dissuade anticipatory saccades, just 
as in Nummenmaa et al., (2009, Exp. 3).  After this random delay, images were displayed for 
1,350 ms.  Then, as in Nummenmaa et al. (2009, Exp. 3) the target crosses appeared either 
simultaneously with (0 ms SOA) or 150 ms after (150 ms SOA) the images onset, at which point 
the subject was to move his/her eye directly to the cross and hold it until the screen went black 
(1000 ms).  After an inter-trial interval of 500 ms, the drift correction screen reappeared 
indicating the start of the next trial, as was done in Nummenmaa et al. (2009, Exp. 3). 
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As in Nummenmaa et al. (2009, Exp. 3) participants completed 10 practice trials to 
acclimate them to the task (practice images were not used in the main experiment).  After 
practice, the eye tracker was re-calibrated and participants completed two blocks of 64 trials (128 
trials total) with a break between the two blocks.  To keep the Experiment 2 method exactly the 
same as Nummenmaa et al. (2009, Exp. 3), the eye-tracker was recalibrated before starting the 
second block and on an as-needed basis if the calibration began to slip.  
 Design 
As shown in Tables 3.3 and 3.5, Experiment 2 was nearly an exact replication of 
Nummenmaa et al. (2009, Exp. 3) both in terms of design and method.  Thus, as in Nummenmaa 
et al., (2009, Exp. 3) the same 3, two-level, independent variables were manipulated in 
Experiment 2.  There were two SOAs of 0 and 150 ms.  Valence of the images (positive or 
negative) was randomly selected on each trial with the constraint that valence was 
counterbalanced across trials throughout the experiment.  Lastly, the visual field of the emotional 
content (left or right) was also randomly chosen and counterbalanced.  The dependent variables 
of interest were saccade latency, saccade endpoint deviation ratios and saccade curvature ratios. 
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Table 3.3 Comparison of Key Design Details of Nummenmaa et al. (2009, Exp. 3) and 
Experiment 2 
  Nummenmaa et al. (2009, Exp. 3) Experiment 2 
Independent 
variables 
Valence (2 levels, w/in subjects); Visual 
field (2 levels, w/in subjects; SOA; 2 
levels, w/in subjects) 
Exactly the same 
Dependent 
variables 
Saccade latency, signed saccadic 
curvature ratios, signed endpoint 
deviation ratios 
Exactly the same 
IVs randomized 
and 
counterbalanced 
Yes Yes 
Trials blocked? Yes Yes 
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 Results 
A comparison of the results of Experiment 2 to Nummenmaa et al. (2009, Exp. 3) and 
Nummenmaa et al. (2009, Exp. 3) to Experiment 1 can be seen in Tables 3.4 and 3.5 
respectively.  Just as in Nummenmaa et al. (2009, Exp. 3) , to adjust for the potential effect of 
saccade amplitudes, the saccade endpoint deviations and curvature were transformed to represent 
visual angle and divided by their respective amplitudes to create ratios.  These ratios were 
subjected to a 2 (SOA: 0 ms vs. -150 ms) x 2 (Visual field of emotional content: left or right) x 2 
(Valence: pleasant vs. unpleasant) within-subjects factorial ANOVA. 
The saccade latencies were influenced only by SOA with the 150ms SOA (M = 407.2, SD 
= 319.35) producing shorter latencies than the 0 ms SOA (M = 523.58, SD = 383.6), F(1,161) = 
6.015, p = .015, Cohen’s F = .204.  As shown in Table 3.3, this result closely replicates that of 
Nummenmaa et al. (2009, Exp. 3). 
As in Nummenmaa et al. (2009, Exp. 3), the analysis of the endpoint deviations yielded a 
main effect of the visual field of the emotional content F(1, 161) = 8.25, p = .005, Cohen’s F = 
.246.  The saccade endpoints deviated away from the visual field in which the emotional picture 
was contained and the endpoint deviations were similar for both SOAs (F < 1) and both types of 
emotional content (F < 1).  These data are shown graphically in Figure 3.1 along with the similar 
results of Nummenmaa et al. (2009, Exp. 3) for comparison. 
Analysis of the signed saccade curvatures also yielded results consistent with 
Nummenmaa et al. (2009, Exp. 3).  As in their study, while none of the main effects reached 
significance, the SOA x visual field interaction was significant F(1,161) = 6.767, p = .01, 
Cohen’s F = .219.  As in the Nummenmaa et al. (2009, Exp. 3) study, post-hoc analysis revealed 
that with 150 ms SOA, the saccades deviated to the right (M = .004, SE = .009) when the 
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emotional content was presented in the left visual field.  Conversely, when the emotional content 
was presented in the right visual field, saccades deviated leftward (M = -.0017, SE = .012).  
These results are presented graphically in Figure 3.2 alongside the corresponding and similar 
results from Nummenmaa et al. (2009, Exp. 3). 
Table 3.4 Comparison of Key Results of Nummenmaa et al. (2009, Exp. 3) and Experiment 
2 
 Nummenmaa et al. (2009, Exp. 3) Experiment 2 
Division of EM 
parameters by saccadic 
amplitude 
Yes Yes 
Saccadic latencies 
Influenced only by SOA, F = 13.9, 
p < .001. Shorter latencies for 150 
ms SOA than for 0 ms SOA (RTs: 
218 ms and 290 ms respectively) 
Influenced only by SOA, F = 6.015 
p = .005. Shorter latencies for 150 
ms SOA than for 0 ms SOA (RTs: 
407 ms and 523 ms respectively) 
Endpoint deviation 
Main effect of visual field, F = 
8.22, p = .01.  Saccade endpoints 
deviated away from VF containing 
emotional content. Endpoints were 
similar for both SOAs and both 
pleasant and unpleasant images 
(both Fs < 1). 
Main effect of visual field, F = 8.25, 
p = .005.  Saccade endpoints 
deviated away from VF containing 
emotional content. Endpoints were 
similar for both SOAs and both 
pleasant and unpleasant images (both 
Fs < 1). 
Saccadic angle 
No main effects. SOA x VF 
interaction was significant, F = 5.4, 
p = .03. Multiple comparisons that 
saccades curved away from 
emotional content in the 150 ms 
but not 0 ms SOA. 
No main effects. SOA x VF 
interaction was significant, F = 6.76,  
p = .01. Multiple comparisons that 
saccades curved away from 
emotional content in the 150 ms but 
not 0 ms SOA. 
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Table 3.5 Comparison of Key Results of Nummenmaa et al. (2009, Exp. 3) and Experiment 
1 
  Nummenmaa et al. (2009, Exp. 3) Experiment 1 
Division of EM 
parameters by 
saccadic amplitude 
Yes Yes 
Saccadic latencies 
Influenced only by SOA, F = 139, p < 
.001. Shorter latencies for 150 ms 
SOA than for 0 ms SOA (RTs: 218 
ms and 290 ms respectively). There 
were no main effects or interactions 
of emotional content with saccade 
latencies. 
Influenced only by Experience, F = 
24.85, p < .001. Participants with 
less experience had consistently 
longer saccade latencies than those 
with more experience, t = 5.298, p < 
.001. There were no main effects or 
interactions of emotional content 
with saccade latencies. SOA was not 
manipulated (constant 200 ms). 
Endpoint deviation 
Main effect of emotional content, F = 
8.22, p = .01.  Saccade endpoints 
deviated away from emotional 
content.  Endpoints were similar for 
both SOAs and both pleasant and 
unpleasant emotional images (both Fs 
< 1). 
No main effect of emotional content 
or orientation (Fs < 1).  Significant 
effect of Experience F = 2.916, p = 
.017. Participants with high general 
experience scores had greater 
endpoint deviations than those with 
low experience scores, t = 2.72, p = 
.007. 
Saccadic angle 
No main effects of SOA or emotional 
content. SOA x emotional content 
interaction was significant, F = 5.4, p 
= .03. Multiple comparisons that 
saccades curved away from emotional 
content in the 150 ms but not 0 ms 
SOA.  
No effect of emotional content, F < 
1. Threat presence did not produce 
greater deviation compared to 
neutral-only conditions (F < 1). 
There was only a 200 ms SOA which 
differs from the critical 150 ms SOA 
of Nummenmaa et al., 2009, Exp 3 
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Figure 3.1 Comparison of endpoint deviations from Experiment 2 (top) and Nummenmaa 
et al. (2009, Exp. 3) (bottom).  Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.  
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Figure 3.2 Saccade curvature in Experiment 2 (top) compared to curvature from 
Nummenmaa et al. (2009, Exp. 3) (bottom).  Error bars represent 95% confidence 
intervals. 
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 Discussion: Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 successfully replicated all of the important findings of Nummenmaa et al. 
(2009, Exp. 3).  The data of Experiment 2 show that in the 150ms SOA conditions, saccades 
curve away from the emotional images.  The implications of this for the findings from 
Experiment 1 are two-fold.  First, the replication of Nummenmaa et al. (2009, Exp. 3) means the 
oculomotor inhibition paradigm works for indexing attention capture by emotional content.  
Secondly, it offers a couple of different interpretations of the Experiment 1 results.  Which 
interpretation is favored depends on how one views the null findings from Experiment 1.  We 
discussed that the absence of a statistically significant effect of threat pairing in Experiment 1 
could suggest that both ancient and modern threats capture attention.  However, the quantitative 
analyses suggest that neutral images were also capturing attention.  The ability of neutral images 
to successfully compete with threat images for attention strongly suggests that the images used in 
Experiment 1 lack sufficient salience, whether physical salience, emotional salience, or both. 
This interpretation is troubling given that, evolutionarily speaking, humans should certainly be 
more in-tune with the presence of threats than innocuous objects even if they are lacking in color 
information.  
Successfully replicating the findings of Nummenmaa et al. (2009, Exp. 3) demonstrates 
that the oculomotor paradigm should have allowed the data analysis to detect any meaningful 
differences in saccade deviation between the threat conditions spawning from attentional biases.  
The failure to find such effects suggests that either 1) the findings of Nummenmaa et al. (2009, 
Exp. 3) do not generalize to the methodology used in Experiment 1 or 2) the threat images are 
not well suited to capturing attention over neutral images in a way that manifests as deviations in 
saccade trajectories.  Given the wealth of research that shows that threats are capable of 
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capturing attention in other paradigms (e.g., Blanchette, 2006; Brosch & Sharma, 2005; Flykt, 
1999; Fox, Griggs, & Mouchlianitis, 2007; Lipp, Waters, Derakshan, & Logies, 2004; Lipp & 
Waters, 2007; Öhman, Flykt & Esteves, 2001; Öhman, Lundqvist, & Esteves, 2001; Rinck, et al., 
2005), the most likely explanation of the Experiment 1 data is that the intricacies of the 
methodology are not well-suited to eliciting systematic differences.  Thus, it is important to 
consider what aspects of the methodology could explain the lack of an effect of threat pairing.  
The list of important methodological aspects from which we consider is detailed in Table 3.1. 
 The method used in Experiment 1 differed from the methodology of Nummenmaa et al. 
(2009, Exp. 3) in at least four meaningful ways.  First, the images used in Experiment 1 were 
changed to grayscale and equalized in terms of mean luminance and RMS contrast.  This 
difference is illustrated in Figure 3.3.  Second, the single SOA used in Experiment 1 was 200 ms, 
50 ms longer than the 150 ms used in Experiment 2.  Third, the pairing conditions used in 
Experiment 1 included threat-threat (i.e., emotional-emotional) pairings, whereas in 
Nummenmaa et al. (2009, Exp. 3) and Experiment 2 emotional imagery was only paired with 
neutral imagery. Fourth, the stimuli in Experiment 2 was selected upon known valence and 
arousal values and always contained people which are known to capture attention (Fletcher-
Watson et al., 2008).  The Experiment 1 stimuli were solely selected upon their content (i.e., it 
depicted one of our stimulus categories). 
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Figure 3.3 An example of a normal color image used in Experiment 2 (A) and an image 
equalized for mean luminance and RMS contrast as in Experiment 1(B). 
 
 The alteration of the images in Experiment 1 could explain the failure to observe an 
attention bias if color information in images is necessary for attention capture.  In fact, all of the 
past research cited herein that showed facilitated attention to threats used colored stimuli 
(Blanchette, 2006; Brosch & Sharma, 2005; Flykt, 2005; Lipp et al., 2004; Lipp & Waters, 2007; 
McGlynn, Wheeler, Wilamoska, & Katz, 2008; New, Cosmides,  & Tooby, 2007; Öhman, Flykt, 
& Esteves, 2001). Considering the grayscale and adjusted images used in Experiments 1 versus 
the full color images used in Experiment 2, the color-is-necessary explanation is plausible.  One 
reason this may be, for instance, is that many of the images used in Experiment 2 depicted 
human bodies.  The flesh tones and human forms in these images can signal to a viewer that a 
person in present. Additionally, the negative valence images in Experiment 2 often depicted 
mutilated bodies.  This mutilation introduces organic (e.g., blood red-brown) colors that, when 
paired with a human form, can also serve as an indication that something extremely emotional is 
depicted.  If you stare at the white dot between images A and B, you may feel as if your eye is 
drawn to image A.  This roughly illustrates the idea that Experiment 2 color images are often 
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more salient and likely carry weights heavier than grayscale images in terms of neural activation 
in the saccade motor map.  Additionally, the positive valence images in Experiment 2 often 
depicted nude bodies and pornography.  Such strongly emotional and arousing imagery may be 
what it takes to capture attention to the extent that the saccade program is affected. Such graphic 
depictions and use of form paired with organic color information were not present in Experiment 
1.  The differences between the Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 stimuli are illustrated again in 
Figure 3.4.  
The increased salience of the Experiment 2 images could be derived from a combination 
of the color and the forms present in the images.  The Experiment 1 images contained the 
emotionally salient forms but lacked the associated colors.  A combination of the color and form 
image properties may be critical to provide viewers with enough information to then render the 
images more emotionally salient.  Following this logic, a useful question for future research is 
whether color in emotional imagery is a precursor for it becoming emotionally salient. This 
could easily be tested by replicating Experiment 2 again using monochrome images.  If the 
emotional bias disappeared under those conditions it would strongly suggest that color is 
necessary for attention capture by emotional content. 
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Figure 3.4 Examples of images from Nummenmaa et al. (2009, Exp. 3) and the present 
Experiment 2 in which flesh tones and blood red provide important information (column 
A) as to the emotional content of the image. Similar color information was not available in 
the Experiment 1 stimuli (column B). 
 
 A further possible explanation for the difference in results between Experiments 1 and 2 
was the fact that Experiment 2 used a 200ms SOA, which was 50ms longer than the longest used 
in Experiment 1.  Given the ultra-rapid nature of visual attention to images (VanRullen & 
Thorpe, 2001), an extra 50 ms may have been enough time for participants to disengage their 
attention from the distractor images in order to focus on the main task.  Such disengagement (if it 
were occurring) would explain a lack of saccadic deviation and straighter saccades to the saccade 
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target. Indeed, Nummenmaa et al. (2009, Exp 3) and Experiment 2 showed significant deviation 
in the saccades whereas Experiment 1 did not.  Because the saccades in Experiment 1 were 
essentially straight (statistically speaking), this disengagement is plausible. 
The third plausibly important difference between the methods used in Experiments 1 and 
2 was the condition pairings.  Experiment 2 only utilized emotional-neutral pairs whereas 
Experiment 1 paired emotional content with emotional content.  An example of such image 
pairing can be seen in Figure 3.5.  If emotion in general, drives attention biases, pairing two 
threatening images would have washed out any systematic effects that may have been present.  
Logically, this leads to the argument that any meaningful differences should have then 
manifested only in those conditions where a threat was paired with a neutral stimulus.  However, 
analyses yielded no such result.  Therefore, it is possible that exposure to multiple threats over 
the course of the 576 trials in Experiment 1 led to some sort of attentional adaptation, whereby 
subjects became desensitized to the constant presence of threats and the attention system was not 
affected to a significant degree between threat conditions.  The desensitization hypothesis is 
plausible given that Bartholow, Bushman and Sestir (2006) showed that repeated exposure to 
violent and threatening imagery decreased the amplitude of the P300 event related potential 
“which has been associated with activation of the aversive motivational system (p. 532).” 
Another important difference between the methodology of Experiments 1 and 2 is that 
Experiment 1 contained a large number of trials that could have potentially contributed to subject 
fatigue.  In fact, regression analyses support this possibility. This, and other, important 
methodological differences between Experiments 1 and Nummenmaa et al. (2009, Exp. 3) are 
detailed in Table 3.1. 
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 The fourth major difference between Experiments 1 and 2 lies in the content of the 
stimuli.  The Experiment 2 stimuli consisted solely of IAPS images selected on the basis of their 
known valence and arousal value.  By using images known to be extremely negative and highly 
arousing or extremely positive and highly arousing and pairing these with images that displayed 
none of these characteristics, Experiment 2 has maximized the chances of eliciting an emotional 
bias.  This is contrasted with the Experiment 1 where the stimuli were selected solely on the 
content.  If an image clearly depicted one of our stimulus categories, it was included.  
Considered with the fact that emotional-emotional pairs were used, this methodology could have 
minimized the chances of eliciting an attentional bias.  Furthermore, all Experiment 2 stimuli 
depicted people which are known to be very capable of capturing attention (Fletcher-Watson et 
al., 2008).  Experiment 1 stimuli varied in terms of whether or not they depicted people. 
Experiment 2 does well to allow us to speculate on the reasons its data differ so greatly 
from Experiment 1.  However, because Experiment 2 was not designed to empirically test these 
speculative hypotheses, additional research should be conducted to determine the key 
methodological details that allow the attentional bias for emotional content to manifest.  Is it the 
presence of color?  Is it the perfect SOA?  Could it be a combination of the two, or something 
entirely different?  These are worthy questions for future research. 
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Figure 3.5 An example of pairing a neutral image with an emotional image (Top row) 
versus pairing two emotional images (Bottom row). With the neutral-emotional pair, the 
emotional image may be a much more emotionally salient image.  Such stark differences in 
emotional content, such as that shown in the top row, may make the competition for 
attention between the two images, not much of a competition at all.  The strong emotional 
content will consistently beat the neutral content for attention resources.  Conversely, with 
the double threat pair there is intense competetion for attention between to immenent 
threats with equivalent image characteristics (in terms of luminance, contrast and color). 
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Chapter 4 - General Discussion 
 The combination of Experiments 1 and 2 has led to three broad conclusions.  These are 1) 
attention biases to emotional imagery are a real and replicable finding, 2) the methodology used 
in Experiment 1 is not well suited for teasing apart differences in attentional processes between 
ancient and modern threats competing for attention, and 3) slight departures from the oculomotor 
inhibition methodology used in Nummenmaa et al. (2009, Exp. 3) may be responsible for 
rendering the Experiment 1 methodology incapable of producing the sort of effect shown in 
Experiment 2.  Nevertheless, Experiment 1 was not completely devoid of meaningful data.  
 Participants’ experience specifically with snakes and spiders was correlated with saccade 
endpoint deviations.  This suggests that there could be a domain specific (i.e., snake and/or 
spider specific) cognitive mechanism that allows experience with snakes and spiders to up-
regulate attention to those threats specifically.  However, because experience levels with snakes 
and spiders were reportedly lower than experiences with knives (for example) and there was no 
such correlation observed with knife threats, it is also plausible that the correlations between 
snake and spider experience and endpoint deviations indicate spurious relationships. 
Given past research (Nodine et al., 1996) that shows experience facilitates attention to 
familiar stimuli, it makes sense that specific experience would lead to larger endpoint deviations 
in the present paradigm.  Speaking from an evolutionary standpoint, it makes sense that learning 
that something is dangerous would facilitate one’s attention to it.  However, given the mixed 
results seen in the analyses regarding the different stimulus categories, it is too early to determine 
whether experience plays a clear role in shaping attention to threats.  No research has yet been 
done systematically investigating the role of experience in shaping threat-detection.  Apart from 
the present study the most relevant work to date regarding experience was done by Fox et al. 
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(2007), who showed that threatening stimuli that participants considered relevant to themselves 
more readily attracted attention.  Thus, more research is needed to more fully understand the role 
of experience in shaping attention to threatening stimuli. 
A final contribution of the present research is the successful replication of Nummenmaa 
et al. (2009, Exp. 3).  This replication adds support to the reliability of attention biases, as 
measured by saccadic deviations and curvature, stemming from emotional content presented to 
parafoveal and peripheral vision. 
 Limitations and Future Research 
 Orientation  
Recall that the analyses in Experiment 1 failed to yield a significant effect of stimulus 
orientation.  It was predicted that any effect of threat pairing that was observed would disappear 
when the pair was presented inverted, thus leading to an interaction between threat pairing and 
orientation.   However, no such interaction was revealed.  A plausible reason for this, as 
mentioned in discussion of the eye position plots, is the probable orientation invariance of 
several of the ancient (snakes and spiders) and modern (knives and syringes) threat stimulus 
categories used in Experiment 1.  Interestingly, when trials with these stimuli are removed from 
the analysis, orientation had a significant effect on endpoint deviation ratios, lending credence to 
the orientation invariance hypothesis.  Future research should attempt to expand on the present 
findings using other categories of ancient and modern threats that have a definite “correct” 
upright orientation, such as the angry human and threatening animal faces in the ancient threat 
category, and the electrical dangers and guns in the modern threat category.  It is likely that such 
work could reveal an attention bias that relies on correct “upright” orientations.  This would 
indicate that the bias was not caused by low-level image properties.  However, any future 
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research in this vein should stick more closely to the methodology of Experiment 2.  
Specifically, color images, 150 ms SOAs, and smaller numbers of trials should be used. 
 Experience and Domain Specificity  
A perplexing pattern of findings in Experiment 1 was the inconsistent effect of 
experience on endpoint deviations.  The omnibus ANOVA revealed significant effects where the 
one-way ANOVAs using the threat specific subscales failed to.  Furthermore, the snake and 
spider experience subscales demonstrated correlations with saccade endpoint deviation.  The 
results of the ANOVAs suggest that a) the omnibus produced a Type I error, or b) the one-way 
ANOVAs produced a Type II error.  Therefore, a limitation of the present data is that they do not 
let us make a determination as to which is more likely.  At first, the strong correlation of snake 
experience with endpoint deviations (when only snake-neutral trials were selected) would 
suggest that the snake-specific one-way ANOVA yielded a Type II error and a domain specific 
cognitive mechanism was in play.  However, given the absence of a similar correlation with the 
knife subscale (which demonstrated even larger experience scores) it is plausible that the snake 
and spider experience correlations with endpoint deviations were spurious (i.e., Type I error).  
These mixed results make it difficult to draw clear conclusions regarding the implications of the 
experience analyses.  For instance, it is impossible to determine from the present data, the degree 
of domain-specificity of a cognitive mechanism allowing experience to affect attention to threats.  
Future research should be designed with the express intent of teasing apart those two 
possibilities.  Perhaps a study could manipulate exposure to various threats through a pre-
experiment learning task and look to determine whether or not specific exposures primed the 
participants to either a) respond more quickly or b) be more apt to have their attention captured 
when the threat was subsequently presented.  This would address domain-specificity of any 
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cognitive mechanism allowing experience to up-regulate attention to specific stimuli.  In regard 
to identifying a less domain-specific mechanism, a different experiment would be needed.  Such 
an experiment would identify two groups of participants.  The first group would be experienced 
with stimulus A and inexperienced with stimulus B and vice versa for the second group.  Using 
some attention-measuring paradigm (such as oculomotor inhibition) researchers would look for 
attention capture by the stimulus with which the participants were experienced or inexperienced.  
If facilitated attention was observed, it would support the existence of a less domain-specific 
mechanism allowing experience to up-regulate attention.  However, a failure to observe attention 
capture would simply mean that particular stimulus combination did not recruit the cognitive 
mechanism if it existed.  Such a result would therefore be inconclusive. 
 No Manipulation of SOA or Procedures Affecting Saccade Latency 
 McSorley et al. (2006) showed that faster saccades tend to deviate towards attention 
capturing stimuli whereas slower saccades deviate away.  He attributed this to the fact that 
reactive feedback to the motor map in the superior colliculus takes time.  Based on this work, we 
had predicted that saccade latency may be systematically related to saccade deviation.  However, 
we found no difference in deviation as a function of saccade latency in Experiment 1.  This was 
likely due to the lack of a direct manipulation of saccade latency through variations in 
procedures (e.g., voluntary versus reflexive saccades, removing the fixation point as an 
additional imperative signal to make a saccade).   
In Experiment 1 all of the saccades were delayed at least 200 ms post-distractor onset 
which is a relatively long stimulus onset asynchrony under which we would expect deviations 
away from the attention capturing stimulus.  Indeed, McSorley et al., showed that early on in 
processing (e.g., 0, 50, and 100 ms SOAs), attention capturing distractors pull saccade deviations 
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toward them.  The switch from saccadic deviations towards distractor stimuli to deviations away 
from distractor stimuli occurred with the implementation of 200 ms SOAs, the same SOA 
utilized in Experiment 1.  Yet we did not see saccades reliably arcing away from a single 
distractor.  This leads to a couple of arguments for why we did not see a systematic attention bias 
with the 200 ms SOA in Experiment 1.  First, McSorley et al. (2006) used simple shapes in their 
study.  Therefore, it is possible that the timing parameters they outlined for producing saccades 
away from distractors do not generalize to the complex stimuli used in the present experiments.  
However, given that our more complex stimuli should take more time process, this explanation 
seems unlikely.  Furthermore, the data from Experiment 2 are roughly consistent with the data of 
McSorley et al.  This adds further doubt to the idea that the 200 ms SOA used in Experiment 1 
was incorrect, or was too long.  Following this line of reasoning, it also casts doubt on the 
speculation that the 200 ms SOA was too long and thus allowed attentional disengagement.  
These arguments together, make the nature of the stimuli used in Experiment 1 the most logical 
cause of the null findings. 
 Unidirectional Effects of Negatively Related Anxiety and Experience 
Both the general experience and general anxiety (although non-significant) measures (and 
by extension their respective inter-correlated subscales) were negatively correlated with saccade 
latencies (i.e., general threat experience and general anxiety were both positively related to faster 
reaction times); however experience and anxiety were negatively related.  Thus, there is a need 
to explain this apparent contradiction in the present data.  How can we explain unidirectional 
effects by two variables with a negative correlation? The most parsimonious explanation of this 
contradiction is to attribute it to self-report biases.  By asking people if they are experienced with 
threats or not and then asking them whether or not things make them anxious, common sense 
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would drive someone to report being more comfortable with a stimulus than they truly are.  
However, a stepwise regression showed that both experience and anxiety scores only accounted 
for about 5% of the variance in saccade latency.  While this analysis yielded a significant result 
(p < .001), there is likely another variable (unobserved here) that can account for the substantial 
amount of unexplained variance and apparent contradictory effects of experience and anxiety on 
saccade latency.  The failure to isolate this variable is a limitation of the present study. Future 
research interested in how personality characteristics affect fear responding should investigate 
this issue. 
 Insensitive Measures 
Another possible shortcoming of Experiment 1 was that the angle deviation measure may 
not have been sensitive enough to capture any meaningful deviations in saccade trajectories 
resulting from threat conditions (although it was with the Experiment 2 methodology).  This 
hypothesis leads to an obvious direction for future research.  Direct saccades to the stimuli in 
Experiment 1 seemed to suggest that threats, particularly ancient threats, attracted more error 
saccades.  Therefore, a logical follow up to Experiment 1 is to utilize a preferential looking 
paradigm to assess the relative ability of ancient and modern threats to capture attention.  In a 
preferential looking paradigm, ancient and modern threat images would be presented 
simultaneously as they were in the present study.  But rather than measuring the minute 
variations in the trajectories of saccades, we would simply measure which images were looked at 
first.  This is a very simple measure of attention allocation since eye movements tend to follow 
attention in space.  However, if the goal is to speak to attention capture this study would need to 
be combined with the oculomotor inhibition paradigm.  Attention “capture” is an involuntary 
response.  Because preferential looking is by definition voluntary (people can look at images 
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they like) such a follow-up study seeking to investigate attention capture would need an index of 
involuntary direction of attention as is possible with an oculomotor inhibition paradigm. 
 Did Image Equalization Dampen Attentional Effects? 
It is also important to consider why the saccade deviation measures were not sensitive 
enough to capture meaningful differences in saccade trajectories as a function of threat-pairing.  
What is interesting is that if you view the eye movement plots on a trial by trial basis, there is 
clear deviation.  This deviation however, does not manifest systematically according to the type 
of threat present.  There is a possible explanation for this seeming failure of our stimuli to 
capture attention.  This study most closely resembles the work of Nummenmaa, et al. (2009, Exp 
3) who used a similar oculomotor inhibition paradigm to index attention capture by color image 
emotional distractors.  However, in the interest of keeping all other things equal, we equalized 
our images in terms of mean RMS contrast and luminance.  Recall that Tipper’s Population 
Coding Theory (Tipper, 2000) holds that deviations in saccade trajectories are directly related to 
the salience of the distractor stimuli (here, threat images).  It is possible that by equalizing our 
images we reduced their bottom-up stimulus salience, thereby adding noise to any systematic 
deviation we may have seen.  Thus, a logical follow up study would be to compare RMS 
equalized grayscale images, un-equalized grayscale images, RMS equalized color images and 
un-equalized color images in terms of their ability to capture attention.  This would tell us 
whether having a normal RMS or color are critical to producing the attentional bias for 
emotional content originally shown by Nummenmaa et al., (2009, Exp 3) and replicated here in 
Experiment 2.  
Recall that one motivation for using the oculomotor inhibition paradigm to assess 
evolutionary constraints placed on threat detection was that a lot of previous work used visual 
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search methodology (e.g., Blanchette, 2006; Brosch & Sharma, 2005; Flykt, 2005; Fox et al., 
2007; Lipp et al., 2004; Lipp et al., 2007) which is sensitive to the visual characteristics of 
stimuli (Duncan & Humphreys, 1989).  However, based on the findings of this study showing 
that an attention bias did not manifest with monochrome and RMS equalized stimuli, it also 
appears that the oculomotor inhibition paradigm is sensitive to the visual characteristics of 
stimuli.  This is an important conclusion in terms of informing methodology of future studies 
using oculomotor inhibition to index attention biases. 
 Implications 
This research has both theoretical and practical implications. Together, the experiments 
conducted here addressed the theoretical issues surrounding how visual fear-relevant stimuli 
capture attention as indexed by eye movements.  For example, Experiment 1 began to address 
the issue of whether one’s personal experiences can shape attention.  
Experiment 1 explored attention capture by ancient versus modern threats when the two 
were competing for attentional resources with each other or some neutral stimulus.  To date, 
some research has shown that emotional scenes can capture attention when competing with 
emotionally neutral scenes (Nummenmaa et al., 2009, Exp. 3).  However, this research was not 
conducted to examine the existence of evolutionary constraints on the processing of fear-relevant 
threatening stimuli.  The results from the Experiment 1 therefore provide fuel for new thinking 
about the extent to which visual attention to threats is based in evolution.  We did not show that a 
particular type of threat was better at capturing attention than another.  In fact, even neutral 
images were capable of capturing attention on a fair amount of trials.  Therefore, at the present 
time not much can be concluded (from this study) regarding the evolutionary constraints on 
threat detection.   
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We do know from Experiment 2 however, that the attention bias to emotion is real, yet it 
may be fickle, requiring specific viewing parameters in order to manifest.  In this regard, a clear 
theoretical implication our findings carry is that low-level image characteristics may be more 
responsible for attention capture than the semantic content of the stimuli.  We did not observe an 
attention bias in Experiment 1 which utilized RMS equalized and grayscale stimuli but, we did in 
Experiment 2 which used unaltered color stimuli.  Thus, as previously suggested, future research 
should attempt to tease apart what specific aspects of emotional imagery are responsible for 
attention capture by systematically manipulating image properties such as RMS contrast and 
color. 
The present experiment has added to the debate regarding whether or not automatic 
attention to fear-relevant threatening stimuli is constrained by evolutionary influence.  While the 
present experiments cannot provide a definitive answer as to the evolutionary underpinnings of 
attention to threats, it is suggested that physical characteristics of the images (e.g., luminance, 
contrast, and color) are at least partly responsible for determining attention capture.  But it does 
not suffice to say that color and contrast are the only critical components responsible for the 
manifestation of the attention bias.  Perhaps it is the combination of color and form cues which 
merge through some cognitive mechanism to provide us cues of biological salience which up-
regulates stimuli to receive rapid attention.  In addition, a hypothesis concerning image color, 
contrast and/or forms is limited in its strictly bottom-up approach.  There are likely top-down 
influences on attention biases as well.  For example, based on the findings of the present study, 
the role of experiences in shaping attention processes deserves further attention.   
In regard to top-down influences on attention, we know from previous work that 
semantics can influence attention.  Most relevantly, the stimuli used in Nummenmaa et al. (2009, 
85 
 
Exp 3) were analyzed using Itti and Koch’s (2000) saliency algorithm.  This computer program 
accounts for image characteristics such as orientation, intensity and color.  Using this algorithm 
provided Nummenmaa et al. with quantitative data regarding the overall saliency of their images 
from a purely stimulus-driven standpoint.  This data was subjected to analyses that revealed no 
significant differences in saliency among the stimuli.  Therefore, we can say with confidence that 
the factors contributing to attention capture in the Experiment 2 replication of Nummenmaa et al. 
(2009, Exp 3) are most likely due to the semantic differences between the stimuli. 
However, in lieu of a direct comparison between color images and 
monochrome/equalized images we cannot rule out the possibility that color information is 
necessary for attention biases to manifest.  As noted earlier, the past studies demonstrating 
attention biases that have used complex image stimuli have presented those stimuli in full color.  
It is important though, to integrate this fact with the fact that McSorley et al. (2006) showed 
attention capture with monochrome simple shapes.  Does this mean that color is only required for 
attention biases to manifest when using complex stimuli?  Not necessarily.  A new study from 
Schmidt, Belopolsky and Theeuwes (2012) uses oculomotor inhibition to show that monochrome 
angry faces capture attention to a greater extent than neutral faces when paired with innocuous 
objects.  So how then do we explain the failure to demonstrate significant differences between 
condition pairings in Experiment 1?  In light of existing research, the wash-out effect from 
pairing two emotional stimuli at first appears a likely explanation.  But, that means there should 
have been systematic deviation with only the threat-neutral pairs.  There was not.  This leaves us 
to suppose that there may be inherent aspects of the Experiment 1 stimuli that render them weak 
in terms of their ability to capture attention.  Unfortunately, the present study is inconclusive in 
that regard. 
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Given the present data, it is much too early to pin down if and how experience affects 
attention, but the mixed findings here merit additional research.  The present data do not allow us 
to offer clear conclusions regarding domain specificity (or even the existence) of such an 
experience integrating cognitive mechanism at this time.  If a cognitive mechanism exists that 
allows experience to influence attention to threats in the environment, future research aimed at 
understanding this mechanism should be designed to explore the domain specificity of it.  This is 
important as degree of domain-specificity is a central issue surrounding the extent to which the 
mechanism is a result of evolution.   
This study is inconclusive in terms of the evolutionary constraints imposed (or not 
imposed) on visual attention to threatening objects.  For this information, it remains necessary to 
rest on the foundation laid by the research of the past three decades.  The studies preceding this 
provide multiple converging lines of evidence from visual search (e.g., Blanchette, 2006; Brosch 
& Sharma, 2005), observational condition (e.g., Mineka et al., 1984), and change detection 
(McGlynn et al., 2008; New, Cosmides, & Tooby, 2006) that attention biases for complex 
stimuli are real phenomena.  It will simply take additional work to more fully understand the 
evolutionary constraints on those biases.  The current results do not allow us to say how this bias 
manifests and what information it selects, particularly with regard to evolutionarily relevant 
versus modern threats.  Going forward, it will be important to further understand how the 
malleability of visual attention to threat is affected by stimulus characteristics in addition to 
gaining a more clear understanding of its evolutionary underpinnings. 
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Appendix A - Experimental Questionnaires 
1. What is your sex? 
Male Female 
2. What is your race? 
Caucasian/White   African-American/Black   Asian Hispanic Native American Other 
3. What is your age? 
4. What is your year in school? 
Freshman Sophomore Junior Senior Other/None of the above 
7. How many times have you been on military deployment? [If never in the 
military choose “1 - Never”] 
1 Never 
2 Currently preparing for first deployment 
3 One deployment 
4 Two deployments 
5 Three or more deployments 
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Please answer the following questions honestly by placing an “X” in the appropriate answer box.  If you do not understand a survey 
item, please ask the experimenter for clarification. There are no right or wrong answers. Do not spend too much time on any one 
statement but give the answer which seems to describe your present feelings best. 
    TRUE FALSE 
1 I would feel some anxiety holding a toy spider in my hand.     
2 If a picture of a spider appears on the screen during as motion picture, I turn my head away.     
3 I dislike looking at pictures of spiders in a magazine.     
4 I don't mind being near a harmless spider if there is someone there in whom I have confidence.     
5 When I see a spider, I feel tense and restless.     
6 I would feel some anxiety holding a toy snake in my hand.     
7 If a picture of a snake appears on the screen during as motion picture, I turn my head away.     
8 I dislike looking at pictures of snakes in a magazine.     
9 I don't mind being near a harmless snake if there is someone there in whom I have confidence.     
10 When I see a snake I feel tense and restless.     
11 I would feel some anxiety holding a toy lion, tiger, wolf or bear in my hand.     
12 If a picture of a predatory mammal appears on the screen during as motion picture, I turn my head away.     
13 I dislike looking at pictures of predatory mammals in a magazine.     
14 I don't mind being near a predatory mammal if there is someone there in whom I have confidence.     
15 When I see a predatory mammal I feel tense and restless.     
16 I would feel some anxiety touching an angry person.     
17 If a picture of an angry person appears on the screen during as motion picture, I turn my head away.     
18 I dislike looking at pictures of angry faces in magazines.     
19 I don't mind being near an angry person if there is someone there in whom I have confidence.     
A-3 
 
20 When I see an angry face I feel tense and restless.     
21 I would feel some anxiety holding a toy gun  in my hand.     
22 If a picture of a gun appears on the screen during as motion picture, I turn my head away.     
23 I dislike looking at pictures of guns in a magazine.     
24 I don't mind being near a gun if there is someone there in whom I have confidence.     
25 When I see a gun I feel tense and restless.     
26 I would feel some anxiety holding a toy knife in my hand.     
27 If a picture of a knife appears on the screen during as motion picture, I turn my head away.     
28 I dislike looking at pictures of knives in a magazine.     
29 I don't mind being near a knife if there is someone there in whom I have confidence.     
30 When I see a knife I feel tense and restless.     
31 I would feel some anxiety holding a toy syringe in my hand.     
32 If a picture of a syringe appears on the screen during as motion picture, I turn my head away.     
33 I dislike looking at pictures of syringes in a magazine.     
34 I don't mind being near a syringe if there is someone there in whom I have confidence.     
35 When I see a syringe I feel tense and restless.     
36 I would feel some anxiety touching an electrical hazard.     
37 If a picture of an electrical hazard appears on the screen during as motion picture, I turn my head away.     
38 I dislike looking at pictures of electrical hazards in a magazine.     
39 I don't mind being near an electrical hazard if there is someone there in whom I have confidence.     
40 When I see an electrical hazard I feel tense and restless.     
A-4 
 
Please answer the following questions as honestly as possible by circling the appropriate response.  If you do not understand an item, 
please ask the experimenter for clarification. There are no right or wrong answers. Do not spend too much time on any one statement 
but give the answer which seems to describe your present feelings best. 
    Never Occasionally Sometimes Frequently 
Very 
Frequently 
1 How often do you use firearms (for work or recreation)? 1 2 3 4 5 
2 
How often were you exposed to firearms growing up (until 
age 18)? 
1 2 3 4 5 
3 
How often were you exposed to firearms in the last 6 
months? 
1 2 3 4 5 
4 How often do you use knives (for work or recreation)? 1 2 3 4 5 
5 
How often were you exposed to knives growing up (until 
age 18)? 
1 2 3 4 5 
6 
How often were you exposed to knives in the last 6 
months? 
1 2 3 4 5 
7 
How often do you encounter electrical hazards (for work 
or recreation)? 
1 2 3 4 5 
8 
How often were you exposed to electrical hazards growing 
up (until age 18)? 
1 2 3 4 5 
9 
How often were you exposed to electrical hazards in the 
last 6 months? 
1 2 3 4 5 
10 How often do you use syringes (for work or recreation)? 1 2 3 4 5 
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11 
How often were you exposed to syringes growing up (until 
age 18)? 
1 2 3 4 5 
12 
How often were you exposed to syringes in the last 6 
months? 
1 2 3 4 5 
13 
How often do you encounter snakes (for work or 
recreation)? 
1 2 3 4 5 
14 
How often were you exposed to snakes growing up (until 
age 18)? 
1 2 3 4 5 
15 
How often were you exposed to snakes in the last 6 
months? 
1 2 3 4 5 
16 
How often do you encounter spiders (for work or 
recreation)? 
1 2 3 4 5 
17 
How often were you exposed to spiders growing up (until 
age 18)? 
1 2 3 4 5 
18 
How often were you exposed to spiders in the last 6 
months? 
1 2 3 4 5 
19 
How often do you encounter predatory mammals (for 
work or recreation)? 
1 2 3 4 5 
20 
How often were you exposed to predatory mammals 
growing up (until age 18)? 
1 2 3 4 5 
21 How often were you exposed to predatory mammals in the 1 2 3 4 5 
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last 6 months? 
22 
How often do you see angry people (for work or 
recreation)? 
1 2 3 4 5 
23 
How often were you exposed to angry people growing up 
(until age 18)? 
1 2 3 4 5 
24 
How often were you exposed to angry people in the last 6 
months? 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Appendix B - State-Trait Anxiety Inventory 
Read each statement and select the appropriate response to indicate how you feel right now, that 
is, at this very moment. There are no right or wrong answers. Do not spend too much time on 
any one statement but give the answer which seems to describe your present feelings best. 
 1 2 3 4 
 Not at all  A little  Somewhat  Very Much So  
  
1. I feel calm  1 2 3 4 
2. I feel secure  1 2 3 4 
3. I feel tense  1 2 3 4 
4. I feel strained  1 2 3 4 
5. I feel at ease  1 2 3 4 
6. I feel upset  1 2 3 4 
7. I am presently worrying  
over possible misfortunes  1 2 3 4 
8. I feel satisfied  1 2 3 4 
9. I feel frightened  1 2 3 4 
10. I feel uncomfortable  1 2 3 4 
11. I feel self confident  1 2 3 4 
12. I feel nervous  1 2 3 4 
13. I feel jittery  1 2 3 4 
14. I feel indecisive  1 2 3 4 
15. I am relaxed  1 2 3 4 
16. I feel content  1 2 3 4 
17. I am worried  1 2 3 4 
18. I feel confused  1 2 3 4 
19. I feel steady  1 2 3 4 
20. I feel pleasant  1 2 3 4 
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STAI Score Sheet 
 1, 2, 5, 8, 11, 15, 16, 19, 20 are reverse scored.  
 Create a sum total for all of the items. 
 
Participant # Sum Score  Participant # Sum Score 
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Appendix C - Eye Sample Plots 
These are the cumulative plots of saccade patterns by condition.  All saccades have been 
rotated such that they are all upward in direction.  Thus, 512 on the abscissa can be thought of as 
the fixation point. The thin red line in the center represents the central axis of the viewing space.  
An example figure below shows the different interest areas in these plots to facilitate 
interpretation. 
 EXAMPLE 
In this example, grey boxes indicate where the images were presented.  The grey cross 
indicates the saccade target.  Shapes have been included to note interest regions in the plots.  The 
rectangles highlight areas of the plots that indicate saccades to a particular image.  In this 
example, there are more saccades directly to the left of fixation than to the right.  The trapezoid 
indicates the region of the saccade that shows the initial deviation angle of the saccade.  In this 
example, there were more deviations to the left than the right.  The ellipse represents the area of 
the saccade where we look for saccade endpoint deviations.  In this example, there is more 
endpoint deviation to the left of the saccade target than to the right. 
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Left: Ancient 
Right: Ancient 
Orientation: Upright 
 
There is a relatively even distribution of eye movements across the midline.  One side 
does not seem to capturing attention a great deal more than another. 
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Left: Ancient 
Right: Modern 
Orientation: Upright 
 
 There is a relatively even distribution in terms of endpoint deviations.  However, initial 
saccade angles deviate away from the modern threats and toward the ancient threats.  
Furthermore, the left (ancient) side appears to be capturing more error saccades where 
participants looked toward the image. 
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Left: Ancient 
Right: Neutral 
Orientation: Upright 
 
 There is a clear pattern here.  Both endpoint deviations and saccade angle deviations are 
predominately deviating toward the left (ancient) side of the display.  Additionally, the ancient 
threat images captured more erroneous saccades to the image. 
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Left: Modern 
Right: Ancient 
Orientation: Upright 
 
 Here, both angles and endpoints deviate toward the left (modern) and away from the right 
(ancient).  However, there is a relatively even distribution of error saccades. 
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Left: Modern 
Right: Modern 
Orientation: Upright 
 
 Here there is a relatively even distribution of angular deviations and error saccades.  
However, the endpoint deviations are predominately on the left. 
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Left: Modern 
Right: Neutral 
Orientation: Upright 
 
 This condition clearly shows more error saccades to the left (modern threat) image.  
Initial angle deviations seem to veer slightly more toward the left (modern).  However, the 
endpoint deviations are relatively evenly distributed. 
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Left: Neutral 
Right: Ancient 
Orientation: Upright 
 
 This plot shows clear attention capture of the right (ancient) images over the left (neutral) 
images. The error saccades are directed predominately to the right where the ancient images are.  
Furthermore, the initial angles consistently deviate away from the ancient images.  This plot 
shows additionally that the endpoint deviations are predominately stacking up on the left, away 
from the ancient threat images on the right. 
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Left: Neutral 
Right: Modern 
Orientation: Upright 
 
 This plot also demonstrates a clear pattern.  Although there is not much difference in the 
error saccades, the initial angles predominately deviate away from the modern threat images on 
the right.  The endpoint deviations show a similar pattern, stacking up on the side opposite from 
the modern threats. 
 
E-10 
 
 
Left: Neutral 
Right: Neutral 
Orientation: Upright 
 
 This plot shows a relatively even distribution of eye locations.  One side is not reliably 
capturing attention over the other. 
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Left: Ancient 
Right: Ancient 
Orientation: Inverted 
 
 There is a fairly even distribution of eye locations in this plot.  However, it appears that 
there be a tendency for the participants to have saccades with leftward angles. 
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Left: Ancient 
Right: Modern 
Orientation: Inverted 
 
 This plot shows an interesting pattern that elucidates an important difference between the 
ancient and modern stimuli.  There is not a large difference in error saccades, although it appears 
that the ancient threats captured a few error saccades.  The important pattern here is that even 
when inverted, modern threats seemed to capture attention as indicated by the leftward initial 
saccade angles.  This is likely due to the orientation invariance of the modern stimuli chosen.  A 
syringe or a knife is still a syringe or a knife no matter which way it is oriented. 
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Left: Ancient 
Right: Neutral 
Orientation: Inverted 
 
 There is a relatively even distribution of eye positions in this plot.  One side does not 
seem to capture attention a great deal more than the other.   When you compare this plot to its 
upright counterpart, there are significantly less error saccades to the ancient images. 
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Left: Modern 
Right: Ancient 
Orientation: Inverted 
 
 This plot clearly shows that the inverted modern threat images captured more error 
saccades.  This is likely due to their orientation invariance.  However, judging by the angles and 
endpoints, it seems as though the ancient images were also capturing attention. 
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Left: Modern 
Right: Modern 
Orientation: Inverted 
 
 This plot shows a relatively even distribution of all measures although it seems as though 
the angles may predominately fall on the left. 
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Left: Modern 
Right: Neutral 
Orientation: Inverted 
 
 This plot shows that the majority of saccades endpoints deviated toward the left (modern) 
and away from the right (neutral).  However, there is not a big difference in initial angles. Also, 
the modern threats seemed to capture more error saccades than did the neutral threats. 
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Left: Neutral 
Right: Ancient 
Orientation: Inverted 
 
 There is a relatively even distribution of eye positions in this plot.  However, the initial 
angles seem to deviate slightly more often to the left, away from the ancient threat images. 
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Left: Neutral 
Right: Modern 
Orientation: Inverted 
 
 This plot shows a clear tendency for the saccades to deviate away from the modern 
threats when they are paired with neutral images.  Again, the orientation invariance of these two 
stimuli likely plays a role in determining this data pattern. 
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Left: Neutral 
Right: Neutral 
Orientation: Inverted 
 
There is an even distribution of eye positions in the plot.  This plot is perhaps the most 
evenly distributed of all of the plots, which is what we would expect with two inverted neutral 
images. 
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Left: Ancient 
Right: Modern 
Orientation: Upright 
 
Ancient threats appear to capture a few more error saccades than do the modern threats.  
However, the deviation of saccade angles is more leftward, away from the modern threats.  
Judging from this plot, it seems that both ancient and modern threats capture attention. 
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Left: Ancient 
Right: Neutral 
Orientation: Upright 
 
 This plot does not provide a clear indication of attention capture of one threat type over 
another. 
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Left: Modern 
Right: Neutral 
Orientation: Upright 
 
 This plot does not provide a clear indication of attention capture of one threat type over 
another. 
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Left: Ancient 
Right: Modern 
Orientation: Inverted 
 
This plot clearly shows that when inverted, ancient threats seem to capture more error 
saccades.  However, the saccades tend to deviate away from the modern threats. 
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Left: Ancient 
Right: Neutral 
Orientation: Inverted 
 
The ancient threats are capturing more error saccades than the neutral images. 
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Left: Modern 
Right: Modern 
Orientation: Inverted 
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Left: Modern 
Right: Neutral 
Orientation: Inverted 
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Left: Neutral 
Right: Neutral 
Orientation: Inverted 
 
